Environmental Law/Environmental Literature by Burger, Michael
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Research Centers & Programs 
2013 
Environmental Law/Environmental Literature 
Michael Burger 
Columbia Law School, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, mhb2004@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Burger, Environmental Law/Environmental Literature, 40 Ecology L.Q. 1 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Centers & Programs at Scholarship Archive. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Sabin Center for Climate Change Law by an authorized administrator of 




What, is truly "environmental" about environmental law? This Article is
the first attempt to answer this question by integrating Law & Literature
scholarship with the study of environmental law. I argue that competing
narratives of nature and culture common to the American environmental
imagination play a more significant role in environmental law and litigation
than previously acknowledged. These competing narratives, communicated
through a known set of environmental stories and tropes, are used by attorneys
to establish, frame, narrate and argue their cases, and they are absorbed,
reimagined, reframed and retold by judges in their written opinions, making
environmental law a kind of expressive, literary event. To illustrate this
process, the Article examines two important and highly visible case studies: the
reintroduction of gray wolves into the Northern Rocky Mountains and the
public nuisance climate change lawsuit that culminated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power. A close reading of the
pleadings, legal briefs and judicial opinions in these case studies demonstrates
that courts respond to and reinforce traditional environmental stories, such as
wilderness tales and the environmental apocalyptic, but evince a strong
preference for a less well-known story, which I call the Progressive
Management Machine. The Progressive Management Machine promises
reconciliation of competing environmental narratives through administrative
process and science-driven decision making, but, in so doing, masks its own
contravention of those same narratives. The approach developed here launches
a larger project exploring the dynamic relationship between environmental
law, literature and narrative. This Article, like the larger project, seeks to
elucidate not only various litigators' and judges' rhetorical strategies but also
the purposes, content and significance of environmental law.
Copyright 0 2013 Regents of the University of California.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that narratives of nature and culture common to the
American environmental imagination play a more significant role in
environmental law and litigation than previously acknowledged. These
narratives, communicated through a known set of environmental stories and
tropes, are used by attorneys to establish, frame, narrate and argue their cases,
and they are absorbed, reimagined, reframed and retold by judges in their
written opinions, making environmental law and litigation a kind of expressive,
literary event. In approaching environmental law and litigation as literature,
this Article comprehends the law as a process of community- and identity-
formation that plays out in acts of storytelling and persuasion'-as a "narrative
way of world-making" 2-and thereby seeks to explore in a new way what is at
stake in arguments about meaning in environmental contexts. This new
approach helps elucidate not only various litigators' and judges' rhetorical
strategies but also the purposes, content and significance of environmental law.
The theoretical and interpretive frameworks developed here represent the
first attempt to integrate Law & Literature scholarship with the study of
environmental law.3 While a number of scholars have sought to produce an
analytic framework for environmental jurisprudence grounded in economics
theory, the principles of ecology or environmental ethics, I suggest that we can
see its development as something less rational, namely, an iterative response to
recurrent and competing stories that seek to instantiate competing
1. The notion of law as a literary and rhetorical performance is deeply informed by James Boyd
White's elaboration on law as "constitutive rhetoric." See JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow:
ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985), and James Boyd White, Constituting the
Culture of Argument: The Possibilities of American Law, in WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984), as well
as Richard Weisberg's construction of the "poethics" of law and lawyering in POETHICS: NARRATIVE
STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992).
2. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN
LEGAL THOUGHT 14 (1988) ("The life of law is not logic nor experience, but a narrative way of world-
making.... Like all tales, legal stories gain meaning and significance from the selective emphasis on
certain features of our always complex and frequently ambiguous experience.... More importantly, it is
the stories themselves that come to comprise the reality of our experience. In this sense, legal stories
mediate our engagement in the world and with others: they provide the possibilities and parameters of
our own self-definition and understanding.").
3. At least one leading scholar has concluded that the humanities in general, and literature in
particular, have little to offer environmental law beyond inspiration for activists. See Eric T. Freyfogle,
Ends and Means in Environmental Law, or the Unlikely Marriage of Law and Letters, 24 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 263 (2006) (arguing that humanities perspectives can only influence law if humanists "direct[] their
comments to the environmental movement as a whole, and through that movement, to the community
itself'); see also Environmental Letters, Environmental Law: A Cross-Disciplinary Conference
Exploring the Impact of the Humanities on Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231 (2006). For
counterpoints, see Charles F. Wilkinson, Language, Law, and the Eagle Bird, in THE EAGLE BIRD:
MAPPING A NEW WEST 8-21 (1992) (proposing that the language of environmental laws be altered to
reflect emotional content and values); Robert R.M. Verchick, Steinbeck's Holism: Science, Literature,
and Environmental Law, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that Steinbeck's integration of science
and compassion can be instructive for policy makers).
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environmental narratives. 4 These stories and narratives, as much as the values
they convey, mobilize parties who are deeply committed to them and become
the focal point for courtroom debates. Which is to say that story, narrative and
rhetoric are essential not only to environmental discourse in general, but also to
environmental legal discourse in particular. 5
To illustrate what this means, the Article examines two case studies: the
reintroduction of gray wolves into the Northern Rocky Mountains and the
public nuisance climate change lawsuit that culminated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power. These case studies
demonstrate that litigants come into court telling certain kinds of stories. These
stories are familiar to readers of American literature and have been helpfully
categorized by scholars in the field of literary studies known as ecocriticism.
They have been divided into such groupings as the pastoral, the wilderness, the
apocalyptic and the toxic. 6 Courts respond to and reinforce these stories but
they also evince a strong preference for a different, less well-known story,
which I call the Progressive Management Machine. The Progressive
4. The connections between narrative, rhetoric and environmental policy and politics have been
broached before. See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New
Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11 (2000); Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino
Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why it (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 441 (2004). For an in-depth examination of the influence of environmental rhetoric on post-
war environmental politics in Maine and Oregon, see RICHARD W. JUDD & CHRISTOPHER S. BEACH,
NATURAL STATES: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION IN MAINE, OREGON, AND THE NATION (2003).
For a look at how the "cowboy myth" factors into public land ranching policy, see Debra Donahue,
Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721 (2005). For a
comparative law perspective on environmental rhetoric and politics, see Ann Brower et al., The Cowboy,
The Southern Man, and the Man from Snowy River: The Symbolic Politics of Property in Australia, the
United States, and New Zealand, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 455, 458 (2008) (observing that parties
claiming rights to resources in publicly owned lands in all three locations "mobilize public support by
tying their desired privilege . .. to widely known cultural icons"). In a different vein, the emerging field
of environmental communication focuses on politics, media campaigns and popular entertainment. See
ROBERT Cox, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2d ed. 2009); JULIA B.
CORBETT, COMMUNICATING NATURE: How WE CREATE AND UNDERSTAND ENVIRONMENTAL
MESSAGES (2006). Additionally, scholarship in the areas of law and psychology examines how
information about the environment is framed by different speakers and received by different audiences.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006)
(analyzing the ways in which "framing effects" on public perception impact the acceptability of different
environmental regulatory strategies); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception
Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change (Cultural Cognition Project
Working Paper No. 89, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1871503.
Notably, climate change has spawned a cottage industry in these areas of academia. The Center for
Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University's Earth Institute, the Center for Climate
Change Communication at George Mason University, and the Yale Project on Climate Change
Communication at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies are all hubs of relevant
activity.
5. On environmental discourse, see generally ROBERT J. BRULLE, DEMOCRACY AND NATURE:
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT FROM A CRITICAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE (2000); MAARTEN A.
HAJER, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE: ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AND THE
POLICY PROCESS (1995).
6. See infra Part II.B.
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Management Machine is a managerial, science-based story about utilitarian
governance that emphasizes the reliability and legitimacy of the modem
administrative state, and promises a reconciliation of other competing stories
through public process and expert reason.7 The promise of the Progressive
Management Machine, however, is often left unfulfilled.
One of the main things lawyers do is tell stories, a fact most obvious when
looking at the ways in which facts are developed and recounted during trials.
But one can also appreciate the way in which individual legal doctrines, or even
all of law, can be viewed as "story."8 To talk about environmental law as
literature, then, does not reduce its significance or threaten its legitimacy.
Rather, it seeks to understand how our environmental law community is
constituted. 9 It offers a way to uncover how we identify and define problems
(and problem-makers), how we conceive desirable goals (and goal-achievers)
and how we craft solutions. It offers a way of explaining from the perspective
of participants what is at stake in environmental disputes. As James Boyd
White noted, such a perspective provides an important contrast to more
standard positivist accounts of law:
From the outside [law] can of course be described as a structure of rules or
a set of institutions, as a tool for policy implementation, and so on, but if it
is looked at from the inside . . . it is better talked about in other terms-as
an art of language, as a way of creating versions of experience in
cooperation or competition with others. From this point of view the law
always begins in story.10
At the outset, I want to define some terms, and for the sake of simplicity,
adopt simple definitions. "Story" in this Article is used in its most conventional
7. The use of "progressive management" is borrowed from the characterization of the
progressive era's conceptualization of "conservation" in Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape
of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 169, 189 (2012), discussed infra notes 16-
17. The use of the metaphoric "machine" is adopted from James Boyd White, Rhetoric and Law, in
HERACLES' Bow, supra note 1, at 30 ("This idea of law and legal science fits with ... the contemporary
conception of our public political world as a set of bureaucratic entities, which can be defined in
Weberian terms as rationalized institutions functioning according to ends-means rationality.... In this
way, the government, of which the law is a part ... tends to be regarded, especially by lawyers,
managers, and other policy-makers, as a machine acting on the rest of the world; the rest of the world is
in turn reduced to the object upon which the machine acts.") (emphasis added). See also Gerald E. Frug,
The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276 (1984).
8. See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 142 (1997)
("Legal doctrine itself may be seen as a set of stories."). Along these lines, Keith Hirokawa has written
about the narrative and rhetorical aspects of legal conceptualizations of property, the environment and
ecosystem services. Keith H. Hirokawa, Three Stories About Nature: Property, the Environment, and
Ecosystem Services, 62 MERCER L. REv. 541 (2011). Scholars have also examined the stories embedded
or recounted in contract law, rape, wills, and other areas. See Baron & Epstein, supra, at 142-43 (citing
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155
(1989)).
9. See HAJER, supra note 5, at 52-53.
10. James Boyd White, Telling Stories in the Law and in Ordinary Life, in HERACLES' BOW,
supra note 1, at 168.
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sense, to refer to an account of an event or sequence of events that unfolds over
time and whose trajectory seeks to resolve, or else call into question the
possibility of resolving, some trouble that intrudes upon a pre-existing state of
affairs.11 "Trope" refers to a figurative representation of nature, in many
instances a representation that stands for a familiar story; it is used somewhat
interchangeably with "story." "Narrative" here refers to a broader entity than
does "trope" or "story," one that includes the communication of stories but is
not only that. It "consists of the cumulative effects of. . . separate stories as
their aggregate meaning comes to light" and "represents one collective way of
knowing things, one communal mechanism for grasping the world."12
Professor Peter Brooks defines this sense of "narrative" as "one of our large,
all-pervasive ways of organizing and speaking the world-the way we make
sense of meanings that unfold in and through time."1 3 "Rhetoric," as used in
the Article, refers to language used to persuade, and not to the pejorative sense
of rhetoric as empty or cynical argumentation. 14
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a meta-analysis of earlier
and ongoing scholarly projects that seek to offer a unifying vision for
environmental law. Part II develops the argument that a narrative approach can
assist in this search by introducing the field of literary studies known as
ecocriticism and the common stories and tropes that ecocritics find in
environmental literature. Parts III and IV then examine how these stories and
tropes appear in the "litigation literature" surrounding the reintroduction of
gray wolves into the Northern Rocky Mountains and the public nuisance
climate change lawsuit mentioned above. I conclude by noting that
environmental stories and tropes continue to emerge and evolve, and offering
some preliminary suggestions for future work that further documents the
11. See Baron & Epstein, supra note 8, at 147-48; ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME
BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: How COURTS RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND HOW THEIR STORIES
CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE LAW-AND OURSELVES 46 (2000) ("[A] story typically
moves from an anterior steady state ... through some setback, reversal, or disruption ... through
strivings to correct or cope with the Trouble ... to either a restoration of the old steady state or the
establishment of a new one.").
12. Baron & Epstein, supra note 8, at 148.
13. Peter Brooks, Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC
IN THE LAW 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
14. My simple definition of rhetoric is informed by Colin Starger's description of the classical
elements of rhetoric-logos (reason-based argument), pathos (emotion- or audience response-based
argument) and ethos (credibility or speaker-based argument)-and his suggestion that logos itself has
different several aspects-formal, empirical, categorical and narrative. See Colin Starger, The DNA of
an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045 (2009). In Starger's
taxonomy, the narrative aspect of logos represents "the logic of storytelling," in which chosen stories
lead ineluctably to certain endings. Id. at 1062-63. For descriptions of the pejorative sense of rhetoric,
see, for example, White, supra note 7, at 31-32 (describing understandings of rhetoric as a "failed
science" and an "ignoble art"); J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and
the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 13, at 211-12 (describing how a negative
view of rhetoric results in neglect of classical tradition); John Hollander, Legal Rhetoric, in LAW'S
STORIES, supra note 13, at 176-86 (describing various lay and technical uses of the term "rhetoric").
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phenomenon of Environmental Law/Environmental Literature.
I. THE SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VISION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
Environmental law suffers from a complexity that makes it hard to pin
down. 15 The diversity of scientific and technical authorities applicable in any
given case and the variety of regulatory approaches adopted by environmental
statutes to similar types of pollution problems pose real obstacles to
conceptualizing environmental law as a coherent, uniform field. Nonetheless,
scholars have long sought a coherence or uniformity that might make
environmental law sensible.
Law and economics analyses represent what may safely be called the
dominant approach. Here, commentators offer self-interested decision making
and the resultant market failures as causal explanations for polluting behavior
and despoliation. Commentators then leverage the idealized welfare-
maximizing utility derived from their explanation to argue for measures that
could, theoretically, achieve greater efficiency in environmental law and
regulation. The hypothetical rational actors at the center of these stories-
whether they be polluters, regulators, environmentalists, judges, or the public-
at-large-have come to serve as the subjects of, and imagined audiences for, a
great deal of environmental law scholarship. Yet, many find this approach
unsatisfying.1 6 The assumption that this is what public law in general, and
environmental law in particular, does or ought to do, is incomplete; viewed
more critically, it is unrealistic and inaccurate. As both a descriptive and
15. See, e.g., Richard Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
619, 624-27 (1994) (describing environmental law variously as "a barely manageable agglomeration of
statutory and administrative trivia," "complicated," "a tangled field" and possessing "mind-numbing
complexity"). For a discussion of how this complexity is implicated in teaching the subject of
environmental law, see Michael Burger, Teaching Intrapersonal Intelligence as a Lawyering Skill:
Introducing Values Systems into the Environmental Law Syllabus, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE
COMPANION 1, 7-8 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol2/issl/l; Joseph L.
Sax, Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,251 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 7 (arguing for a more general understanding of environmental law
as the site of clashes among competing values); William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law:
How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843 (2010) (arguing
that scientific and technological knowledge practices play a constitutive role in shaping the form and
substance of environmental law); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of
Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005) (arguing cost-benefit analysis exacerbates
power disparities between diffuse noneconomic interests and concentrated economic interests). For a
direct attack on the economic approach, see Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008); Douglas Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
675 (2003). For the particular problem with calculating values of human life in cost-benefit analysis, see
LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND
THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8-11 (2004). For a good summary of the justifications for and the problems
with intergenerational discounting, see Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change
and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (2011).
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prescriptive matter it ignores less quantifiable but equally prevalent sources of
motivation and conflict that drive the development of environmental law and
policy.
The law and economics approach ignores the stories people tell about
nature and culture, and how these stories are wrapped up in worldviews that
people cherish.17 Accordingly, there has long been a countervailing movement
to reckon with these issues of personal and political identity and meaning, and
to articulate sources of environmental law's unity and coherence outside of and
beyond economic rationales.
One approach has sought to tackle the question directly, asking whether
environmental law sustains an underlying set of principles or purposes
sufficient for it to cohere as a field of law. 18 Professor David Westbrook made
an early attempt, organizing the "jumble" of environmental law into an "ideal
history" that traced an evolution from common law through the creation and
operation of the administrative state to the more recent structuring of market-
based mechanisms. 19 However, Professor Westbrook's history, illuminating as
it was, failed to provide a unifying environmental principle; rather, the study
placed an almost anti-environmentalist political liberalism at the center of
environmental law. 20 More recently, Professor Dan Tarlock concluded that it is
simply impossible to establish core principles that categorically define the
field. 21 Instead, he argued that environmental review, the polluter pays
principle, the precautionary principle and the goal of sustainable development
can serve as rebuttable presumptions in individual cases to structure a science-
based, dynamic, "but inevitably ad hoc" decision making process. 22 In his book
Regulation from Nowhere, Professor Douglas Kysar reached the opposite
conclusion, offering a renovated precautionary principle as a unifying concept
that ought to be encoded in law, first in statute and, over time, in the U.S.
Constitution. 23
17. See Purdy, supra note 7, at 172 ("[D]ifferent conceptions of nature have been tied up with,
and often essential to, sources of dignity and meaning in both private and civic life.").
18. See Todd Aagard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95
CORNELL L. REv. 221, 225 (2010) (arguing that the conceptualization of environmental law as a legal
field is defined by four "constitutive dimensions": factual context, policy trade-offs, values and interests,
and legal doctrine).
19. Westbrook, supra note 15, at 621-23.
20. In Westbrook's ideal history, the evolution of environmental law is driven by the ongoing
attempt to make the illiberal, "outward-looking" orientation of environmental law conform to the
rhetoric and political demands of liberalism. Id. at 622-24; see also id. at 680-92.
21. A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE 213, 241
(2004) ("[E]nvironmental law is an unstable blend of science-informed ethical postulates.").
22. Id. at 219-20. More recently, Professor Tarlock has taken a different analytic angle,
challenging the prospect of discovering anything to environmental law beyond the rules set forth in
statutes. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is a Substantive, Non-Positivist United States Environmental Law
Possible?, I MICH. J. ENvTL. & ADMIN. L. 159 (2012).
23. Professor Kysar argues that the dominant approaches to environmental regulation fail to
account for the collective values that inspired the invention of environmental law and the ethical
imperatives motivating engagement with environmental issues, and offer no useful guidance on how to
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2013] EAVIRONMENTAL LAW/ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE
A second, related approach has asked whether the Supreme Court treats
environmental law as a distinct field of law. Professors Richard Levy and
Robert Glicksman studied cases from 1960-1989, and concluded that the Court
often reached results at odds with congressional preferences for environmental
protection.24 Professor Richard Lazarus offered a different examination of
decisions from 1969-1999, and concluded that the Court and its Justices have
neither "fully appreciated environmental law as a distinct area of law" nor
"embraced either environmental law's ends or the importance of the values it
emphasizes." 25 Professor Jay Wexler recently followed up on Professor
Lazarus's extensive study by asking a more generic question: Should courts
treat environmental law cases differently than other kinds of cases? 26 His
answer of "No" is grounded in the argument that environmental law is properly
understood and treated as a subspecies of administrative law.27
The debate over the Court's treatment of environmental cases has found a
renewed salience in light of recent litigation that has sought to persuade both
lower courts and the Supreme Court that the common law origins of
define three iimportait relationships that will prove determinative of our environmental fiture, namely
our relationships with "other states," "other generations" and "other forms of life." As Professor Kysar
recasts it, the precautionary principle is big enough to account for economic considerations and values,
ethics and engagements with critical "others." DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 12-16 (2010).
24. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343 (1989).
25. Richard Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 706 (2000). Professor Lazarus's argument is that the Supreme Court's
disregarding environmental aspects of environmental law is wrong; his suggestion is that environmental
law is defined, first and foremost, by its focus on ecological injury. Ecological injury is itself defined by
a number of features, including: the possibility of irreversible, catastrophic or continuing harm; injuries
that occur in places and to people who may be either physically or temporally distant from their
ostensible causes; uncertainty and risk; complex and multiple causes; and the nonhuman, noneconomic
nature of some harms. Id. at 744-48. To the extent Professor Lazarus characterizes individual Justices as
comprehending environmental law as a unique field of law requiring a different set of analytic tools, it is
because they employ language that refers to these elements. See id. at 709-12 (distinguishing Justice
White's "dispassionate, dry, and formalistic" opinions, which make "little effort to elaborate any
particular philosophical vision" with Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Natural Res. Def Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985), which "discussed how factors such as scientific
uncertainty, possible 'irreversible or catastrophic results' and the presence of 'thresholds' in
environmental problems should influence the Court's legal analysis"). To "restore what's environmental
about environmental law," Professor Lazarus recommends that judges bring these features to bear in
making decisions not only in the standard environmental-administrative law case but also in critical
cross-cutting areas such as standing, property law, dormant commerce clause and corporate law. Id. at
749-59.
26. Jay Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260
(2006).
27. Id. Robert Adler provides a persuasive counterpoint to the "environmental law is only
administrative law" argument in his article The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science
in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REv. (2003). In that piece, Professor Adler examines the Supreme
Court's deployment of ecological principles in a broad range of prominent decisions and concludes that
"neutral principles of administrative law, standing alone, do not adequately explain the range of results
in environmental cases." Id. at 355.
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environmental law provide the underlying principles necessary to address the
problems of climate change. While commentators have sought coherence and
unity in analytic frameworks and theory, environmental activists and their
lawyers have advocated that coherence can be found in common law public
nuisance 28 and the public trust doctrine. 29 In each of these instances, the
plaintiffs conceived of and presented their respective doctrine as embodying a
principle of environmental protection that transcends the limitations of any
individual statute.
A third approach has sought to identify and define a degree of coherence
and uniformity by examining the aspirational ethics, cultural values and social
meanings that have historically infused environmental debates. 30 Some have
28. In American Electric Power v. Connecticut, the attorneys general of eight states, the City of
New York and three private land trusts filed suit against four private utility companies and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging that their greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change
and therefore constitute a public nuisance under both federal and state law. 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011). See
also infra Part III. Two other climate change public nuisance cases are also making their way through
the lower courts. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, plaintiff property owners alleged that certain power and
chemical companies' GHG emissions contributed to climate change, which in turn exacerbated the
harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, constituting a public nuisance. 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010),
petition for writ of mandamus denied sub nom., In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). The case has a
convoluted procedural history, featuring a dismissal in district court, a reversal at the Fifth Circuit, an en
banc decision to vacate the reversal due to failure to muster a quorum, plaintiffs' filing a writ of
mandamus asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the panel decision, the denial of the writ, and
plaintiffs' re-filing their case in district court. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 839 F. Supp. 2d 849,
855-68 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (dismissing re-filed complaint on preemption, political question, standing, res
judicata and collateral estoppel grounds). In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., a federally
recognized tribe claimed that several large energy companies' greenhouse gas emissions constituted a
public nuisance as they have contributed to the sea level rise that threatens the continued existence of the
tribe's island village. 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding federal common law nuisance action seeking
damages displaced by Clean Air Act).
29. In May 2011, a coalition calling itself Our Children's Trust filed lawsuits against the federal
government, eleven separate state governments, and the government of the Ukraine, claiming that the
governments were obligated under the public trust doctrine to take action on climate change in order to
protect future generations. See Felicity Barringer, Suit Accuses U.S. Government of Failing to Protect
Earth for Generations Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05
/science/earth/05climate.html. For archived copies of the organization's complaints, see Federal
Lawsuit, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/page/51/federal-lawsuit (last updated
June 28, 2012). As of October 30, 2012, a federal district court had dismissed a lawsuit against EPA for
failure to state a federal claim. See Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012). State courts in
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon and Washington all dismissed complaints
against their respective states on various grounds. See generally Lawsuits By State, OUR CHILDREN'S
TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/page/52/lawsuits-state (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (providing links to
summaries and status updates of individual state cases). Courts in both New Mexico and Texas denied
defendants' motions to dismiss and found that the public trust might extend to atmospheric impacts. Id.
In Iowa, plaintiffs lost an appeal of an administrative decision to deny their petition for rulemaking and
have appealed that decision to the Iowa Supreme Court. See Iowa, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST,
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/iowa (last updated May 1, 2012). In California, plaintiffs voluntarily
withdrew their complaint without prejudice. See Calfornia, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST,
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/califomia (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
30. Professor Westbrook's analytic adventure in the history of environmental law anticipates the
more recent endeavors noted just below in at least two important ways. First, he grants an early
recognition to the central importance of Bill McKibben's The End of Nature, the challenge posed by
2013] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW/ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE 11
focused on the regulatory and management side of environmental law:
Professor Alejandro Camacho asked how the ecological and wilderness values
at the heart of natural resources law can be reconciled with assisted species
migrations induced by climate change. 31 Professor Jared Goldstein, examining
the related issue of the law's response to invasive species, asked whether the
nationalization of nature that emerged from the Transcendentalist tradition
presents unintended discriminatory overtones. 32
Others have focused on judicial treatments: Professor Jonathan Cannon
cast a series of Supreme Court cases on constitutional issues and statutory
interpretation as battlegrounds where the prevalent values that characterize
environmentalism as a social movement-including the recognition of
interconnectedness or interdependence, a sense of urgency or "ecocrisis," and
ecocentric, other-regarding values-come into conflict with autonomy and
free-market values that characterize the "dominant social paradigm" or
mainstream American perspective. 33
Yet others have focused on intellectual history. In two recent articles, for
example, Professor Jedediah Purdy addressed the thematic of the American
environmental imagination. In one, he mapped four historical conceptions of
the natural world onto different environmental laws and natural resources to
show how conflicting values and ideas of nature have shaped the law.34 In the
climate change and human engineering to notions of "Nature," and the possibilities of wilderness and
wildness. Second, his investigation of "the invention of Nature" and "the American environmental
consciousness" is a direct antecedent to future attempts to implicate cultural conceptions of the
environment in the development of environmental law. Westbrook, supra note 15, at 674-80.
Westbrook's view that the preservationist ethic, tied as it is to a recognition of the intrinsic value of
nature, is politically weak, a "commitment ... [that] underwrites very little environmental law," and that
the conservationist, management-based approach predominates, comports with much of the literature
that followed. Id. at 676-77.
31. Alejandro Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law
Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (2010). As Professor Camacho explains, "[a]ssisted
migration is controversial because it challenges foundational tenets of conservation law and ethics that
seek to preserve and restore preexisting biological systems and shield them from human interference."
Id. at 176. Indeed, "assisted migration ignites long-smoldering tensions in American natural resources
policy" by "commit[ing] natural resource management to active and long-term human manipulation
and control, running counter to imbedded conservation ideals that aim to allow natural systems to
function apart from human interference." Id. at 210. It also places species diversity values against native
ecosystems values, and the predictive capacity against a usually backward-looking management regime.
Id. Thus, Camacho concludes pointedly that the entire issue raises the foundational question of "what
does 'natural' mean anymore?" Id. at 224.
32. Jared Goldstein, Aliens in the Garden, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 685 (2009).
33. Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (2006). See also Jonathan Cannon, Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in
Rapanos and Carabell, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 277 (2007).
34. Each of these conceptions is tied to specific figures in particular historic periods. Providential
Republicanism is associated with the appropriation of land from Native Americans and the disbursement
of federal land to individuals that accompanied westward expansion through the late nineteenth century.
Progressive Management is associated with the turn-of-the-century thinking of Gifford Pinchot,
President Theodore Roosevelt and Walter Weyl, the editor the New Republic. Romantic Epiphany is
most closely associated with John Muir's writing, and with the preservationist movement represented by
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other, he argued that understanding the history of these conceptions is
important for understanding how to advance the climate change agenda because
these conceptions, translated by social movements into the political arena, have
always been integral to national debates about meaning and identity.35
This Article adds another dimension to the search for environmental vision
in environmental law. Purdy's quartet of American imaginaries, Cannon's New
Environmental Paradigm, Goldstein's nationalized nature and Camacho's post-
romantic, new-ecological ethics each touch to a degree on the narrative and/or
rhetorical aspects of environmental law, but they give those aspects less than
fulsome treatment. Moreover, they make little to no reference to the literature
on the relationship between law, rhetoric and narrative. 36 By opening up the
analysis of environmental law to the narrative and rhetorical choices made at
various stages in actual litigation, and thereby invoking a new way of reading
environmental law, I hope to illuminate the living languages and imaginations
fueling and informing today's conflicts. Indeed, in contrast to previous
efforts-which defined environmental law as a body of law pertaining to
actions that affect the environment, or that have the purpose of protecting the
environment, or that reflect a particular environmental ethic 37-I define
environmental law as a battle among well-defined, well-known and competing
stories.38
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE
Law & Literature is often divided into two primary categories: law in
literature and law as literature. Studies of law in literature generally examine
representations of lawyers, the legal process and the law in works of fiction.
Work in this area often endorses the notion that reading and interpreting texts
in this way has certain beneficial effects for law students, lawyers and legal
the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. Ecological Interdependence is associated with contemporary
environmentalism, from Rachel Carson's Silent Spring through the passage of the major environmental
statutes and through the technocratic implementation of those statutes that continues today. See Purdy,
supra note 7, at 178-210.
35. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1129 (2010).
36. Professor Tarlock is the most dismissive of rhetoric, considering the kinds of values that
predominate in environmental rhetoric as at best secondary to the practice of environmental law:
"Environmentalism has deep roots in the aesthetic and emotional appeal of nature worship as well as in
rationality. However, the environmentalism that drives policy and law is a product of the
Enlightenment's faith in reason and knowledge, as opposed to theology, to benefit society." Tarlock,
supra note 21, at 243. Lazarus and Wexler each advocate for the judicial use of rhetoric in
environmental law cases, but their "rhetoric" referring to language used solely for persuasive effect,
independent of any substantive content or constitutive force. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 25, at 739;
Wexler, supra note 26, at 274-76.
37. Cf Aagard, supra note 18, at 261 nn.173-75 and accompanying text (identifying "three main
types" of definitions of environmental law and citing to articles).
38. See Douglas E. Abrams, Lochner v. New York (1905) and Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008):
Judicial Reliance on Adversary Argument, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (2011) (examining the central
role of lawyers' advocacy in shaping judicial outcomes in two prominent Supreme Court decisions).
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scholars, such as instigating the examination of one's ethical stance and
professional identity, provoking a more critical engagement with the law or re-
humanizing law. 39 Studies of law as literature break down along two lines: the
interpretation of appellate court opinions using methodologies familiar to
literary criticism and theory,40 and the evaluation of the role of storytelling,
narrative and rhetoric in the law.4 1 This Article falls into the law as literature
camp, adopting an ecocritical vocabulary in order to understand the role of
storytelling, narrative and rhetoric in environmental law. This Part connects the
present study to the broader discourse on law, narrative and rhetoric, and then
introduces the field of ecocriticism and the environmental stories and tropes
that are most relevant to the case studies that follow in Parts III and IV.
A. Law, Narrative, Rhetoric
Studies of law as literature often constitute a form of historical criticism 42
and seek to expose marginalized meanings. 43 Two key assumptions behind
these studies are that legal claims are necessarily narrative44 and that narratives
are the means through which different values are expressed. 45 In this view, law
becomes literary, a producer of meanings and an avenue for self-expression,
rather than solely a mechanism for enforcing rules or resolving disputes. And
legal processes-pleadings, briefs, oral arguments and opinions on the judicial
39. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 1; ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (LAW,
MEANING, AND VIOLENCE) (1994); RICHARD POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 305-44 (rev. ed. 1998)
(discussing the "edifying school of legal scholarship"); James Boyd White, Book Review, What Can a
Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (reviewing the first edition of Judge
Posner's Law & Literature). Professor Daniel Solove maintains a useful website with an evolving
bibliography for those interested in reading examples of law in literature. See Daniel J. Solove, Law &
Literature, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://docs.law.g
wu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Law-Humanities/Law-Literature-Syllabus.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
40. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 201 (1990); Judith Resnik, Constructing the Canon, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221 (1990); John
Leubsdorf, The Structure ofJudicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REv. 447 (2001); Ino Augsberg, Reading
Law: On Law as a Textual Phenomenon, 22 LAW & LITERATURE 369 (2010).
41. For an overview of the storytelling and narrative strain of scholarship, see Nancy Levit,
Reshaping the Narrative Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 751, 753-59 (2011) (describing history of legal
scholarship on storytelling and narrative). For rhetoric, see generally INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
42. Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW'S
STORIES, supra note 13, at 61 ("[T]o tell a story about law, or to suggest that legal texts have underlying
narratives, is to engage in a species of historical criticism of law . . . .").
43. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 13, at 16
(determining that studies of storytelling in law seek to "convey meanings excluded or marginalized by
mainstream legal thinking").
44. GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 208-09 (2000)
(finding that "legal claims necessarily narrate transactions, moral dramas of condemnation and
rectification, and institutional histories").
45. Weisberg, supra note 42, at 63 (noting that "certain ethical, political, and legal values
manifest themselves or operate only in the medium of narratives by which a culture or nation defines
itself').
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side, and petitions, denials, rulemakings, technical studies and public comments
on the regulatory side-become expressive, literary performances.
In contrast to criminal cases, where there is inevitably an inherent moral
drama and a transparently human story, 46 it is less intuitive to look for
narratives in environmental law cases, where a multiplicity of actors convene to
debate economics, science, risk assessments, cost-benefit analyses, the proper
role of administrative agencies and the appropriate degree of deference they
should be afforded. Yet, narrative is essential to environmental discourse. The
interpretation of law as a means to policy ends such as optimal environmental
regulation, the preservation of biodiversity or the protection of fishable and
swimmable waters, necessarily deploys narratives that bridge the authorizing
statute, the administrative action and the goal. 47 This rhetorical purpose is
essential to the role narrative plays in law. Legal narratives do not tell stories
for the sole purpose of telling stories, nor do they simply entertain, educate and
edify; they are always what Professor Robert Cover characterized as "violent"
events, intended to persuade audiences to enact power in particular ways.48
Thus, while a novel or short story is susceptible to analysis as a form of
persuasive rhetoric, 49 a story told to a court demands such a perspective. 50
Therefore, in approaching environmental law as literature, I do not attempt
to deconstruct its legitimacy or to transform it from an authored enactment of
46. See, e.g., BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 44, at 261-64 (discussing Kim Scheppele,
Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073, 2085-94 (1989) (interpreting rape trial as contest of
narratives)); Alan Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 13, at
99-105 (arguing that the role of a defense lawyer is primarily to disrupt narrative form); Richard K.
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV.
39 (1994) (questioning strategy of presenting lay jury with overly postmodern view of story and event);
Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 55 (1992) (analyzing narratives in competing arguments in murder trial).
47. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 44, at 265.
48. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 4-10 (1983).
49. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 44, at 219-24.
50. This offers an opportunity for what Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux term a "positive
rhetorical project," one that focuses on "rhetorical strategies displayed within the ongoing practices of
legal and literary interpretation." Introduction to Section III: Rhetorical Politics, in INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATuRE, supra note 41. Levinson and Mailloux, however, have a more normative project in
mind than my own largely descriptive endeavor. Their aim is to construct a formal hermeneutics for
interpreting law that displaces a "foundationalist" or "absolutist" view of law-which holds that there is
some definitive norm against which alternative interpretations must be measured-and replaces it with a
"rhetorical line that precedents, models, convictions, and values are relative to a specific discipline and a
specific environment and can vary in time and in space." Id. at 341-42 (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, in their view, "one analyzes legal reasoning, not by measuring interpretations against texts or a set
of formal rules, but by examining how interpreters justify meaning through informal argumentation
within a given cultural setting." Id. at 343. Such an approach does have significance for this project,
though. In particular, this approach counters the emphasis in environmental law scholarship on
environmental ethics by bracketing the question of whether, for instance, preservation of wildness is
good, whether ecosystems represent the proper scale, whether distributional consequences and justice
concerns must be considered, and instead looks at the historically contingent values of American
environmental law.
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power into a decentralized cultural meme. 51 Indeed, the project here is to
examine and comprehend the tropes, stories and narratives embedded in
environmental law, and the identities and institutions with which they engage.
B. Ecocriticism
Ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and the
physical environment. 52 As an intellectual discourse, it seeks to synthesize
literary criticism with both the natural sciences (especially ecology) and
environmental ethics and philosophy. 53 As a field of study, it has been defined
as much by its environmentalist purposes as by any particular theory or
methodology. 54 Thus, the eco-critic Glen A. Love once pronounced: "The most
important function of literature today is to redirect human consciousness to a
full consideration of its place in a threatened natural world." 55 Unsurprisingly,
there are plenty of Deep Ecologists to be found among the ecocritical cohort. 56
Yet, the utility and purposes of ecocriticism are not limited to ideological
advocacy.
Traditionally, ecocriticism focused primarily on works by the British
Romantic poets and the American Transcendentalists, as well as on wilderness
stories, travelogues and nature writing.57 As it has matured, it has broadened to
provide readings of popular culture, architecture, land use and artificial
intelligence. Its scope continues to expand into other areas implicating the
relationship between nature and culture. 58 Little ecocritical attention, however,
51. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 44, at 22-23.
52. Cheryll Glotfelty, Introduction: Literary Studies in an Age of Environmental Crisis, in THE
ECOCRITICISM READER: LANDMARKS IN LITERARY ECOLOGY xix (Cheryll Glotfelty & Harold Fromm
eds., 1996).
53. Serpil Oppermann, Theorizing Ecocriticism: Toward a Postmodern Ecocritical Practice, 13
ISLE: INTERDISC. STUD. IN LITERATURE & ENV'T 103, 105 (2006).
54. Id. at 107 (quoting JOHN TALLMADGE & HENRY HARRINGTON, READING UNDER THE SIGN OF
NATURE ix (2000) ("[E]cocriticism is really less a method than an attitude, an angle of vision, and a
mode of critique.")). See also LAWRENCE BUELL, THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRITICISM:
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND LITERARY IMAGINATION 44-47 (2005) (discussing differing views on
persuasive ends of ecocriticism).
55. Glen A. Love, Revaluing Nature: Toward an Ecological Criticism, in THE ECOCRITICISM
READER, supra note 52, at 237.
56. Oppermann, supra note 53, at 107 (noting that the purposes of ecocriticism include "'a move
toward a more biocentric world-view, an extension of ethics, a broadening of humans' conception of
global community to include nonhuman life forms and the physical environment"' (quoting READING
THE EARTH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF LITERATURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT xiii (Michael P.
Branch et al. eds., 1998))).
57. GREG GARRARD, ECOCRITICISM: THE NEW CRITICAL IDIOM 4 (2011).
58. This comports with Richard Kerridge's description of an ecocritic as one who sets out "to
track environmental ideas and representations wherever they appear, to see more clearly a debate which
seems to be taking place, often part-concealed, in a great many cultural spaces." Richard Kerridge,
Introduction, in WRITING THE ENVIRONMENT: ECOCRITICISM & LITERATURE 5 (Richard Kerridge &
Neil Sammells eds., 1998). Recent works that exemplify this trend incorporate social ecology, urban
environmental issues, cultural studies, and feminist, postcolonial and literary theories. See DAVID W.
GILCREST, GREENING THE LYRE: ENVIRONMENTAL POETICS AND ETHICS (2002); THE GREENING OF
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has been given to the cultural processes and products of environmental law. 59
Yet, environmental law deploys a number of stories and tropes that, as
recognized by ecocriticism, are evident in environmental literature and have
come to define environmental discourse in the United States. These include the
pastoral, the apocalyptic, wilderness and wildness, animal stories, toxic tales,
the global commons as icon and artificial intelligence/cyborg literature.60
Several of these-the pastoral, the apocalyptic, wilderness and wildness, and
the toxic tale-appear in the case studies that follow. Here, I pause to introduce
the stories relevant to this study, and how they are thought to function in
literature. In Parts III and IV, I examine the deployment of wilderness and
wildness and the environmental apocalyptic in the context of two case studies.
1. The Pastoral
The pastoral trope dates to classical times and adapts to any number of
political perspectives and uses. The term "pastoral" may itself refer to
representations that fall into any one of three categories: the literary pastoral,
which involves a literal retreat from city to country; the more general notion of
a literature that distinguishes between country and city; and the pejorative sense
of an idealization of rural life that obscures the reality of labor, animal use and
environmental harms. 61 Arguably, ecology represents a contemporary pastoral
type, at least insofar as it continues to depend on notions of homeostasis and
LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP: LITERATURE, THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Steven Rosendale ed., 2002);
BEYOND NATURE WRITING: EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF ECOCRITICISM (Karla M. Armbruster &
Kathleen R. Wallace eds., 2001); THE ISLE READER: ECOCRITICIsM, 1993-2003 (Michael P. Branch &
Scott Slovic eds., 2003); GLEN A. LOVE, PRACTICAL ECOCRITICISM: LITERATURE, BIOLOGY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2003); Special Forum on Ecocriticism and Theory, 17 ISLE: INTERDISC. STUD. IN
LITERATURE & ENV'T 754-99 (2010) (compiling statements from prominent ecocritics on new
directions for theory).
59. There may be any number of reasons for this, including the institutional and theoretical
difficulties in critically challenging the science and scientism that drive environmental decision making.
Indeed, it is one thing for an ecocritic to say that ecstatic enthusiasts such as Henry David Thoreau or
John Muir, or even more scientifically grounded advocates such as Aldo Leopold or Rachel Carson, are
"imagining" nature; it is quite another thing to say that environmental agencies and Article III courts are.
Nonetheless, there have been a number of attempts to describe the direct influence of nature writing on
the social movement of environmentalism and environmental politics. See, e.g., DANIEL J. PHILIPPON,
CONSERVING WORDS: How AMERICAN NATURE WRITERS SHAPED THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
(2004); DANIEL G. PAYNE, VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS: AMERICAN NATURE WRITING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1996); PAUL BROOKS, SPEAKING FOR NATURE: How LITERARY
NATURALISTS FROM HENRY THOREAU TO RACHEL CARSON HAVE SHAPED AMERICA (1980); SUSAN L.
FLADER, THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN: ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN ECOLOGICAL
ATTITUDE TOWARD DEER, WOLVES AND FORESTS (1994); M. Jimmie Killingsworth, Maps and Towers:
Metaphors in Studies ofEcological Discourse, 13 ISLE: INTERDISC. STUD. IN LITERATURE & ENV'T 83,
83-89 (2006). At the same time, there is a long history of critical thinking about the role science plays in
environmental law and policy. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 16, at 848-54 nn. 9-28 and accompanying
text (discussing dynamics between environmental science and policy and citing to foundational sources).
60. See generally LAWRENCE BUELL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION: THOREAU, NATURE
WRITING, AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1996); GARRARD, supra note 57.
61. GARRARD, supra note 57, at 33.
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equilibrium that establish the environment first encountered as the best or most
natural one. 62
The pastoral project is to craft an image and a myth for the natural
world.63 It operates by situating people in what theorist Leo Marx termed the
"middle landscape," a pasture bordered on one side by the city and on the other
by the wilderness, but spared the "deprivations and anxieties" of both.64 So
situated, the pastoral simultaneously casts its view backwards and forwards in
time; as a consequence, pastoral stories may be inflected with nostalgia (an
idealization of some older past), or else with prolepsy (a sense of prophesy or
utopianism). 65 These differing but often overlapping orientations are reflected
in the generic forms the pastoral adopts: the elegy, which looks back to a lost
history; the idyll, which celebrates an abundant present; and the utopia, which
looks forward to an idealized future. 66 Each of these orientations and forms
plays a role in environmental law stories.
2. Wilderness and Wildness
In this country, the idea of wilderness has achieved a religious or quasi-
religious quality. It expresses core values such as authenticity, freedom and
purity, while holding out the possibility of refuge from the modern/post-
modem world. 67 Though it shares some of the pastoral's anthropocentric and
humanist values, the wilderness idea emphasizes the importance of non-human
nature. 68
The literary origins of the American wilderness can be traced to Henry
David Thoreau's account in The Maine Woods of his experience on the peak of
Mount Ktaadn. 69 The experience of this place, and of the profound difference
62. Id. at 34.
63. See BUELL, supra note 60, at 31-33.
64. LEO MARx, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN
AMERICA 22 (1964).
65. GARRARD, supra note 57, at 37.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 59 (Wilderness "holds out the promise of a renewed authentic relation of humanity and
the earth, a post-Christian covenant, found in a space of purity, founded in an attitude of reverence and
humility.")
68. Importantly, the idea of wilderness also has a distinct lineage, with its origins found not in
poetry or fiction but in nonfictional forms, including the personal essay, nature writing, and philosophy.
Id. at 59-84. Much has also been written in law reviews and legal scholarship concerning the idea of
wilderness, much of it stemming from Roderick Frazier Nash's enormously influential work,
WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1967). Any list is bound to be incomplete, but several good
starting points may be found at Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62
(2010); John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955 (2005); Sarah
Krakoff, Settling the Wilderness, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1159 (2004).
69. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THE MAINE WOODS 70 (Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1864) ("It is
difficult to conceive of a region uninhabited by man. We habitually presume his presence and influence
everywhere. And yet we have not yet seen pure Nature, unless we have seen her thus vast and drear and
inhuman ... .Nature here was something savage and awful, though beautiful.. . . This was that Earth of
which he have heard, made out of Chaos and Old Night.").
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between civilization and wilderness, is for Thoreau a sublime and
overwhelming immediacy. 70 This experience was subsequently popularized by
John Muir, whose My First Summer in the Sierra and other writings defined for
so many the ecstatic experience and the intrinsic value of nature. 71 Edward
Abbey's writings are perhaps the most perfect modern literary exemplar of the
wilderness experience, and of that profound sense of otherness. 72
The wilderness idea is also connected to the ways in which wild animals,
including wolves, have been understood.73 For those who love or admire them,
wild animals are, like wilderness, linked with notions of authenticity, freedom
and purity; but unlike wilderness, animals are often understood as metaphors
for human beings, and as symbolic of aspects of human character or human
spirit. 74 In this way, wild animals-whether they are the subject of a hunter's
target or a photographer's lens-are prized for their wildness and how that
reflects on the human condition.75 At the same time, this wildness provokes
70. Id. at 71. ("What is this Titan that has possession of me? Talk of mysteries! -Think of our
life in nature, -daily to be shown matter, to come into contact with it, -rocks, trees, wind on our
cheeks! the solid earth! the actual world! the common sense! Contact! Contact! Who are we? where are
we?").
71. GARRARD, supra note 57, at 67-68.
72. Explaining his purposes in moving into a trailer in Arches National Monument in Utah (the
life experiment/sojourn described in Desert Solitaire), Abbey wrote:
I am here not only to evade for a while the clamor and filth and confusion of the cultural
apparatus but also to confront, immediately and directly if it's possible, the bare bones of
existence, the elemental and fundamental, the bedrock which sustains us. . . . To meet God or
Medusa face to face, even if it means risking everything human in myself. I dream of a hard
and brutal mysticism in which the naked self merges with a nonhuman world and yet
somehow survives still intact, individual, separate. Paradox and bedrock.
EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS 6 (1968). Like the pastoral, the
idea of wilderness has come under critical scrutiny, perhaps most famously by the environmental
historian William Cronon. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or Getting Back to the
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 (William
Cronon ed., 1995).
73. Though it may prove overly reductive, one can divide animal discourse along a "wild-
domestic" axis. Some critics tend to focus on representations of wild animals, others on domestic
animals. See GARRARD, supra note 57, at 137-40. The divide along this axis roughly corresponds to the
divide between those who espouse environmental ethics as the reason for greater protections for animals
and those who espouse animal rights as the reason. Id. at 140.
74. Id. at 140 (noting the "play in likeness and difference in the relationship of humans and
animals ... may be analyzed in terms of the distinction of metonymy and metaphor"). See also
LAWRENCE BUELL, WRITING FOR AN ENDANGERED WORLD: LITERATURE, CULTURE, AND
ENVIRONMENT IN THE U.S. AND BEYOND 201-04 (2001) (describing "big creature bias" in American
environmentalism).
75. For many years, the emphasis in animal representations and animal advocacy was on
individuals and species, and the mode of representation was highly anthropomorphic, or "Disney-fied."
In the 1980s, audiences began demanding more accurate, more scientifically grounded representations in
film and documentary. GARRARD, supra note 57, at 152-53. The move from pastoral, Disney-fied
representations to scientific, objective ones-a process that would conceptually be linked to the same
"maturation" presumed to accompany a move from pantheism to ecology-reached its most recent
stopping point in the concept of biodiversity. Id. at 158. Animals are no longer thought to be important
because they are like us or different from us in revealing ways, nor because they live lives that are
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fear, distrust and a range of other rational and irrational responses that have
always fueled the eradication instinct.
3. The Environmental Apocalyptic
Apocalyptic narrative has for many years served as a standard feature of
environmentalist arguments, 76 appearing in everything77 from book-length
polemics78 to commercial science fiction79 to self-consciously literary fiction80
to documentary film. 81 Though the apocalyptic narrative fell out of favor
during the 1970s, when widespread environmentalism appeased the rhetorical
needs of the environmental movement, and the 1980s, when the environmental
movement was responding to a series of attacks from the Reagan
Administration and the wise use movement, climate change has revived its
use. 82 Climate change is particularly appealing to the environmental
imagination because it blurs the boundary between nature and culture, posing
specific threats to our understandings of place, wilderness, seasonality, natural
phenomena and human values seeded deep in the American consciousness by
Henry David Thoreau.83 By now, its potentially world-altering effects are
widely understood, and we have moved into imagining not only the end of the
world as we know it, but also how to re-conceptualize the post-climate change
environment84 and adapt to it. 8
aesthetically pleasing to observe, but because they participate in a larger scientific reality,
"biodiversity," which is critical to another environmentalist goal: "sustainability." Id.
76. M. Jimmie Killingsworth & Jacqueline S. Palmer, Millennial Ecology: The Apocalyptic
Narrative from Silent Spring to Global Warming, in GREEN CULTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 21 (Carl G. Herndl & Stuart C. Brown eds., 1996).
77. For a comprehensive overview of apocalypse in the environmental imagination, see
FREDERICK BUELL, FROM APOCALYPSE TO WAY OF LIFE: ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN
CENTURY (2003).
78. See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION
BOMB (1968).
79. See, e.g., T.C. BOYLE, A FRIEND OF THE EARTH (2001); KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, FORTY
SIGNS OF RAIN (2005).
80. See, e.g., CORMAC MCCARTHY, THE ROAD (2006); LESLIE MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY
(1977).
81. AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Lawrence Bender Productions & Participant Productions 2006).
82. Killingsworth & Palmer, supra note 76, at 37-40. The reality of biodiversity loss has also
generated its own apocalyptic literature. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback:
Imperfect Legal Responses to Biodiversity Loss, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13 (2005).
83. BUELL, supra note 60, at 280.
84. See BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989); Westbrook, supra note 15; Camacho,
supra note 31.
85. The literature on adaptation is already vast and is growing. Some salient samples include J.B.
Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation ofEnvironmental Law, 40 ENvTL.
L. 343 (2009); Alejandro Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty
through a Learning Structure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change
Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Concerns, 40 ENvTL. L. 1159 (2009); Robin
Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead" -Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 9 (2010); Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the
Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (2011).
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The environmental apocalyptic is rooted in the Christian prophetic
tradition and remains "the single most powerful master metaphor that the
contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal." 86 Its imaginative
appeal transcends logical force, including the logic one might apply to
determine the probability of an actual apocalypse.87 The environmental
apocalyptic operates on the imagination along several dimensions. Most
obviously, it is a "shock tactic" designed to win over its audience.88 Its features
are iconoclastic,8 9 seeking to instigate change in individuals' stances toward
the status quo. At the same time, it is tied to a "pastoral logic" that "rests on the
appeal to the moral superiority of an antecedent state of existence when
humankind was not at war with nature in the way that prevails now." 90 This
logic produces a "doubleness," in which the writing appeals to nostalgia by
invoking a sense of a world that is soon to be lost. 91 But, it is not yet lost and
the environmental apocalyptic leaves open the possibility that human
intervention can still avoid the looming catastrophe. 92
This possibility has helped popularize the form most closely associated
with the environmental apocalyptic: the jeremiad. 93 The narrative structure of
the jeremiad, whose origins can be traced back to the Puritan preacher Jonathan
Edwards and his contemporaries, includes four central elements: 1)
identification of a chosen people that has failed to keep covenant with key
values or principles, 2) the threat that the people will suffer calamity as a result
of this failure, 3) the possibility that calamity may yet be avoided by a return to
the righteous ways of the covenant, and 4) the promise that "through proper
action the chosen people shall recapture their favored status and avoid ruin."94
The jeremiad form has proven important to bridging the distance between the
aesthetic/spiritual and management-centered orientations that play into the
86. BUELL, supra note 60, at 285.
87. Id. ("Of no other dimension of contemporary environmentalism ... can it be so unequivocally
said that the role of the imagination is central to the project; for the rhetoric of apocalypticism implies
that the fate of the world hinges on the arousal of the imagination to a sense of crisis.").
88. Killingsworth & Palmer, supra note 76, at 22. For a counterpoint, see the counterintuitive
reading of the post-climate change film The Day After Tomorrow in Michael Salvador & Todd Norton,
The Flood Myth in the Age of Global Climate Change, 5 ENVTL. COMM. 45 (2011) (arguing that the
film's rhetorical structure undermines rather than supports calls for public action to curb global climate
change).
89. Killingsworth & Palmer, supra note 76, at 41.
90. BUELL, supra note 60, at 300-01.
91. Id.
92. But see Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing
Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, 3 ENVTL. COMM. 151 (2009) (discussing the tragic
variant of apocalyptic rhetoric, in which human efforts are futile, and analyzing both comic and tragic
variations on the apocalyptic frame of climate change discourse).
93. See generally Scott Slovic, Epistemology and Politics in American Nature Writing, in GREEN
CULTURE, supra note 76; Killingsworth & Palmer, supra note 76; Amy Patrick Mossman, Apocalyptic
or Precautionary? Revisioning Texts in Environmental Literature, COMING INTO CONTACT:
EXPLORATIONS IN ECOCRITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 (Annie Ingram et al. eds., 2007).
94. Salvador & Norton, supra note 88, at 47.
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environmental movement, balancing "the need for anxiety with the need for
efficacy and the need for awe with the need for functionalism" to sustain
collective action. 95
4. Toxic Tales
Toxic tales-such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Terry Tempest
Williams's Refuge and Don DeLillo's White Noise-can at their most generic
scale be defined as "expressed anxiety arising from perceived threat of
environmental hazard due to chemical modification by human agency." 96 The
stories are marked by four common characteristics: 1) they recount stories of a
"rude awakening" from the nalvet6 of simpler times to the complexity of
modem or post-modem society; 97 2) they convey images of a "world without
refuge from toxic penetration;" 98 3) they tell a moral tale of David versus
Goliath, usually in the form of victimized communities versus unchecked
corporate power; 99 and 4) they tend to transform into gothic stories that give a
guided tour of an underworld, always cast in terms of good and evil, and
designed to "instill shock and compassion in uninitiated readers."' 00 The tales
both "reinforce the deromanticization and [] urge the expansion of 'nature' as
an operative category."' 0 Thus, nature is important not in its invocation of a
particular pastoral idea, nor in its manifestation as a wilderness refuge, but
precisely because of its impacted nature, because it is already always a "second
nature." 1 02
III. THE WOLF WARS
The reintroduction of gray wolves into the Northern Rocky Mountains is
one of the most visible and powerful events in the history of American
environmental management. 103 For more than two decades, the controversies in
Montana, Idaho and Wyoming have captivated local and national audiences. 104
95. Id. at 49.
96. BUELL, supra note 74, at 30-31.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id. at 38.
99. Id. at 40. Professor Buell notes that this trope has been integral to the development of the
environmental justice movement, effectively promoting "a self-conscious, informed sense of local self-
identification, victimage, and grassroots resistance encapsulated by the image of 'communities' or
'neighborhoods' nationwide combatting 'unwanted industrial encroachment and outside penetration."'
Id. at 41.
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Id.
103. See Martin A. Nie, The Sociopolitical Dimensions of Wolf Management and Restoration in
the United States, 8 HuM. ECOLOGY REV. 1, 1 (2001) (explaining that reintroduction of wolves
represents "one of the most important stories that will be told about wildlife policy and American
environmentalism").
104. See, e.g., Frank Clifford, Wolves and the Balance of Nature in the Rockies, SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Howling-
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Throughout this time, wolf politics has played a central role in legal and
regulatory decision making, 105 the scientific judgments that inform wolf
managementl 06 and the judicial process.1 07
In this Part, I examine the appearance of wilderness and wildness stories
in the sprawling litigation that has enveloped the Northern Rocky Mountain
(NRM) wolves, with the hope of demonstrating how myths, mystifications and
other narrative constructions inform the legal disputes. I look at several aspects
of parties' and courts' narrative construction of the wolves: 1) how wolves are
characterized and how parties' interests in and concerns about the wolf are
defined; 2) how the courts have corralled the parties' radically different stories
into the court-preferred story of the Progressive Management Machine; and 3)
how politics has trumped law, marking an unexpected triumph of myth over
management. To set the stage for the analysis, I begin with a short history of
the NRM wolves.
A. A BriefHistory of Wolves and WolfManagement in the Northern
Rocky Mountains108
Prior to settlement by Europeans and their descendants, the gray wolf
Success.html; James William Gibson, Cry, Wolf EARTH ISLAND J., Summer 2011, available at
http://www.earthisland.org/joumal/index.php/article/cry-.wolf/ (depicting "culture war" over gray
wolves in the Northern Rockies).
105. Wolf politics have factored into everything from the design of the wolf recovery program, see
generally HANK FIScHER, WOLF WARS: THE REMARKABLE INSIDE STORY OF THE RESTORATION OF
WOLVES TO YELLOWSTONE (1995), to state gubernatorial elections, see Ray Hunkins Opposes Litigation
of State and Fish and Wildlife Service, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, May 1, 2006, at 39, to Congressional
appropriations negotiations, see, for example, Phil Taylor, Wolf Delisting Survives Budget Fight, as
Settlement Crumbles, ENv'T & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 11, 2011, available at http://www.eenew
s.net/public/EEDaily/2011/04/11/5.
106. See Dale D. Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk About
Recovery, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 33-39 (2009); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Defenders of Wildlife v.
Salazar: Delisting the Children of the Night in the Northern Rocky Mountains, 31 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REv. 1 (2010).
107. Rob Dubuc, The Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Delisting: What Would Leopold Think?, 32
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 215, 220 (2009) (noting that when it comes to litigation over the
Northern Rocky Mountain wolves, "where those courthouse doors are located plays a very big factor in
the final outcome of any legal challenge").
108. The story I tell is redacted from a number of sources. For the sake of convenience I rely
primarily on a handful of law review articles: Julie S. Thrower, Ranching with Wolves: Reducing
Conflicts Between Livestock and Wolves Through Integrated Grazing and WolfManagement Plans, 29
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 319, 329-43 (2009); Dubuc, supra note 107, at 222-26; Jennifer Li,
The Wolves May Have Won the Battle, But Not the War: How the West Was Won Under the Northern
Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan, 30 ENVTL. L. 677 (2000); Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare
Ranching, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 101-06 (1992); Valerie M. Fogleman, American Attitudes
Towards Wolves: A History of Misperception, 13 ENVTL. REv. 63, 64 (1989); Holly Doremus, Restoring
Endangered Species: The Importance ofBeing Wild, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1 (1999). These articles,
in turn, synthesize a number of earlier primary and secondary studies, including, most notably, BRUCE
HAMPTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN WOLF (1997), and BARRY HOLSTUN LOPEZ, OF WOLVES AND MEN
(1978). The articles also incorporate much history gleaned from case law and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's voluminous contributions to the Federal Register.
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occupied the entire North American continent, with the exception of the
extreme Southeast, which was occupied by the red wolf, and certain
uninhabitable desert environments in California. It has been estimated that
there were somewhere between 150,000 and 750,000 wolves on the continent,
including some 35,000 in the area in and around Yellowstone National Park.
Upon the Europeans' arrival, wolves were forced into retreat, as fears,
superstitions and religious beliefs shaped negative attitudes toward the New
World wilderness and the wolves who inhabited it.109 Although the first
trappers and hunters on the Western frontier mostly left wolves alone, in the
1850s and 1860s, a trade in wolf pelts developed.
In the 1870s, livestock were introduced into the Rocky Mountain West,
and the tension between ranchers and wolves took hold. With buffalo and wild
ungulate populations decreasing, wolves turned to cattle herds. Though wolves
were only one of many causes of livestock loss, by the end of the nineteenth
century, ranchers claimed as much as 50 percent of their herds were being lost
to wolf depredations. In the 1870s and 1880s, ranchers hired private guns to
hunt wolves, and enlisted the aid of state governments, who passed legislation
establishing wolf bounties. In 1914, the eradication of the wolf became official
U.S. policy; Congress appropriated funds to the Biological Survey, the
predecessor agency to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), for the
specific purpose of killing wolves. By 1930, the gray wolf was eliminated from
the Northern Rocky Mountains. By 1945, only lone wolves were known to
exist anywhere in the lower forty-eight states.
The change in social perceptions of the wolf, which has led to efforts at its
recovery, is often attributed to the environmentalist movement and the 1973
passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), but reconceptualization of the
wolf actually began much earlier. First, Horace Albright, director of the
National Park Service from 1929-1933, established a policy that recognized the
wildlife value of top predators and prohibited the trapping or poisoning of
wolves within National Parks. 110 Then, in 1933, George Wright, an early
ecologist, wrote that wolves and other rare predators ought to be considered the
"special charges of the national parks."" 1 In 1944, Aldo Leopold first
articulated the idea of reintroducing wolves into Yellowstone. 112 And in 1963
Leopold's son, Starker Leopold, issued a government report that suggested that
wolves were necessary to control Yellowstone's out-of-control elk herd and the
109. Goble, supra note 108, at 101 ("European cultures traditionally have viewed wolves as
darkness incarnate, the devil barely disguised. For the past 400 years, Euro-Americans have sought to
exterminate the beast."). See also Li, supra note 108, at 681-82 ("Early European immigrants brought
folklore and superstitions which were fashioned into a deep-seated prejudice against wolves. Medieval
tales of wolves feeding on children, solitary travelers, and corpses from wars and plagues were common
throughout France, Spain, and Russia. This background led to an immense fear of and aversion to
anything wolf-like, and people suspected of being werewolves were often executed.").
110. Dubuc, supra note 107, at 223.




destructive consequences it had on the ecosystem. Starker Leopold's suggestion
was, like the wilderness movement with which it coincided, informed by an
Edenic vision of the American wilderness and the story of the Fall that came
with settlement.1 13 In the report, he charged the National Park Service to
"recreate the ecologic scene as viewed by the first European visitors."11 4
Ten years later, after passage of the ESA, FWS listed the NRM gray wolf
subspecies (Canis lupus irremotus) as an endangered species.1"5 In 1978, FWS
moved away from subspecies distinctions and listed the gray wolf (Canis
lupus) as an endangered species throughout the lower forty-eight, except in
Minnesota where it was listed as threatened.11 6 In 1980, the Northern Rocky
Mountain Wolf Recovery Team issued a plan for wolf recovery in the area,11 7
but no action was taken until 1987 when FWS signed a revised plan.11 8 The
1987 plan called for repopulation of gray wolves in three areas: Glacier
National Park in northwest Montana, the massive wilderness areas in central
Idaho and Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming. 119 Recognizing that a
population of gray wolves had already migrated south from Canada into
Glacier National Park, the plan called for the "natural" recolonization of
Montana and Idaho; because Yellowstone was geographically remote from the
Montana population, the planners determined that wolves would have to be
artificially reintroduced there. 120
In 1992, FWS initiated an environmental review process for the 1987 plan.
By all accounts, the public meetings were contentious. 121 The final
environmental impact statement (FEIS), issued in 1994, endorsed several
critical choices that differed from the 1987 plan:
It called for reintroducing wolves into both Idaho and Yellowstone.
It established a biological recovery goal of ten breeding pairs and
approximately one hundred wolves for three consecutive years in each of the
three target areas. 122 It also concluded that genetic exchange among the
113. See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, REINVENTING EDEN: THE FATE OF NATURE IN
WESTERN CULTURE (2003).
114. A.S. LEOPOLD, ET AL., ADVISORY BOARD ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT, Summary, in WILD
MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL PARKS: THE LEOPOLD REPORT (1963), available at http://www.
cr.nps.gov/history/online books/leopold/leopold.htm.
115. Amendments to List of Endangered Fish and Wildlife, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,678 (June 4, 1973)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
116. Reclassification of the Gray Wolf in the United States and Mexico, with Determination of
Critical Habitat in Michigan and Minnesota, 43 Fed. Reg. 9607 (Mar. 9, 1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
117. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY PLAN (1980).
118. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY PLAN (1987).
119. Id.atv.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 105, at 145-49.
122. The FEIS also noted that this was a "somewhat conservative" goal, and "should be considered
minimal." U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Appendices to THE REINTRODUCTION OF GRAY WOLVES INTO
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK AND CENTRAL IDAHO, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
42 (1994) [hereinafter FEIS].
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populations, and the establishment of a "metapopulation," was a critical
element of recovery.1 23
It reintroduced wolves as "nonessential, experimental populations" under
the newly created section 10(j) of the ESA.1 24 The section 10(j) designation
provides that subject populations be treated as "threatened," rather than
"endangered."' 25
It defined a "problem wolf' and the appropriate means of managing it
under section 10(j). 126 FWS has since issued several iterations of regulations to
manage "problem" wolves under section 10(j).127
In 1995 and 1996, the recovery program began. So did the litigation.
B. Representations of the Wolf in the Litigation Literature
When lawyers and judges talk about wolves, we are talking about two
things at once: real wolves and imagined wolves.1 28 The real wolf is an actual
creature, beyond our perceiving her, naming her, describing her, categorizing
her or otherwise defining her.129 In contrast, the imagined wolf is a symbol, a
product of our invention defined by the context in which we place it.1 30 yet,
lawyers and judges do not acknowledge that the latter is involved in our
evaluation of how to deal with the species.
In this Part, I argue that the pleadings, briefs and judicial opinions
involving the NRM wolves are populated with three types of imagined wolves:
the Scientific Wolf, the Historic Wolf and the Mythic Wolf, which may
manifest either as the transcendent spirit of wildness and ecological order or
else as the threatening force of darkness encroaching on economic interests and
123. Id. ("Thirty or more breeding pairs comprising some 300+ wolves in a metapopulation (a
population that exists as partially isolated sets of subpopulations) with genetic exchange between sub-
populations should have a high probability of long-term persistence.").
124. Environmental Consequences, in FEIS, supra note 122, at 32.
125. Amendments to the Endangered Species Act of 1982 § 10(j)(2)(C), 96 Stat. 1411 (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2006)).
126. Alternatives, in FEIS, supra note 122, at 4.
127. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Establishment of a Nonessential
Experimental Population of Gray Wolves in Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming, Idaho, and
Montana, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,252 (Nov. 22, 1994); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Gray Wolves in Central Idaho and
Southwestern Montana, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,266 (Nov. 22, 1994); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Regulation for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population
Segment of the Gray Wolf, 70 Fed. Reg. 1285 (Jan. 6, 2005); Revision of Special Regulation for the
Central Idaho and Yellowstone Area Nonessential Experimental Populations of Gray Wolves in the
Northern Rocky Mountains, 73 Fed. Reg. 4720 (Jan. 28, 2008); Reinstatement of Protections for the
Gray Wolf in the Western Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains in Compliance With Court
Orders, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,356 (Dec. 11, 2008).
128. See generally S.K. ROBISCH, WOLVES AND THE WOLF MYTH IN AMERICAN LITERATURE
(2009).




the rancher's way of life. 131 Given the extent of the litigation,1 32 I focus on a
few examples: Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, an early case
from the mid-1990s challenging the original reintroduction of wolves into
Idaho and Wyoming; 133 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall (DOW v. Hall 1), a 2008
case where a coalition of environmentalist plaintiffs and wolf advocates
successfully enjoined a FWS rule that would have delisted the NRM gray
wolf; 134 and Gordon v. Norton, a 2003 Tenth Circuit case involving a claim
that the NRM wolf recovery program was an unconstitutional taking of an
historic ranch in Wyoming.135
1. The Scientific Wolf
The Scientific Wolf is a wolf defined by its biological, morphological,
ethological and ecological characteristics. 136 The Scientific Wolf always
appears in legal documents because every party and judge must describe the
subject of the litigation, and the Scientific Wolf is what the ESA deals with. 137
Descriptions of the Scientific Wolf in the NRM litigation commonly focus on
the same mix of elements: taxonomy, diet and predation, range, breeding
patterns, pack size, pack behavior, dispersal, ecological function and economic
impact. Naturally, parties and courts emphasize different elements to different
degrees, depending on the specific issue at hand and the desired rhetorical
affect.
For example, in DOW v. Hall I, environmental groups challenged an FWS
rule that would have designated and delisted a NRM distinct population
segment, effectively devolving management authority to all three states,
opening up local hunting seasons on the wolf, and subjecting wolves to
Wyoming's largely unregulated predator control program.13 8 In their
complaint, the plaintiffs described the wolves as "the largest wild member of
the dog family (Canidae)," with "fur [that] ranges from white to shades of gray
131. These categories are adopted from Robisch's discussion of "the Corporeal Wolf," the
"Eradicated Wolf' and the "Ghost Wolf." See generally id.
132. Between 1995 and 2011 no fewer than nine lawsuits were filed challenging various aspects of
the federal government's management of the NRM wolf recovery program. See, e.g., Wyo. Farm Bureau
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000); Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2005); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall (DOW v. Hall 1), 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Mont. 2008); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 09-
CV-1 18J, 2010 WL 4814950 (D. Wyo. Nov. 18, 2010); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 360 F. Supp.
2d 1214 (D. Wyo. 2005).
133. See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997).
134. DOW v. Hall I, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
135. Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).
136. ROBISCH, supra note 128, at 16.
137. Cf Andrew Long, Defining the "Nature" Protected by the Endangered Species Act: Lessons
from Hatchery Salmon, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 420 (2007).
138. See DOWv. HallI, 565 F. Supp. 2d at I175.
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to coal black."' 39 They are "social animals that normally live in packs of 2 to
12 wolves that have strong social bonds with each other," in part because they
are "usually family groups consisting of a breeding pair (the 'alpha male' and
the 'alpha female'), their offspring from previous years, and an occasional
unrelated wolf."1 40 The wolves' "most common prey are elk, white-tailed deer,
mule deer, moose, pronghom antelope, and bison," and though they prefer the
wild prey they "sometimes also prey on domestic livestock, including sheep
and cattle."l41 However, "[w]olf predation on livestock represents a relatively
minor source of total livestock mortality in Montana, Idaho and Wyoming."1 4 2
By contrast, the risk wolf removal poses to the survival of the species is severe:
"Research demonstrates that when one alpha wolf is removed from a pack, the
probability that the pack will successfully breed the following year is generally
halved. When both alpha wolves are killed the short-term reproductive
potential of the pack is approximately destroyed."' 43 What's more, "[t]his
impact is exaggerated for smaller or less concentrated wolf populations" such
as the experimental populations in the NRM zone. 144
What plaintiffs describe here is a Scientific Wolf whose characteristics
correspond to the "sacred wolf of environmentalist America,"1 45 a wild yet
tender and curiously familiar animal of minimal adverse consequence whose
existence hangs by the thread of ESA protections. Contrast this with the
description put forward in the Department of Justice's opposition to plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction:
Pack sizes in the NRM average about ten wolves in protected areas, but a
few substantially larger complex packs have formed in Yellowstone
National Park. Packs typically occupy large distinct territories from 200-
500 miles, which they defend against other wolves and wolf packs. Once
occupied by resident wolf packs, an area becomes saturated and wolf
numbers within the area are regulated by available prey, dispersal, intra-
species conflict, and other forms of mortality. Wolves can disperse
extremely long distances in their search to join another pack or form a pack
of their own. Pack social structure is highly adaptable and resilient.
Although typically only the top ranking male and female in a pack breed
and produce pups, breeding members can be quickly replaced, either by
other wolves within the pack or by wolves outside the pack, and pups can
be reared by other pack members if their parents die. As a result, wolf
populations can rapidly recover from severe disruptions, including very
high levels of disease or human-caused mortality. After severe declines,
139. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 34, DOW v. Hall I, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160






145. ROBISCH, supra note 128, at 20.
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wolf populations can more than double in just two years if mortality is
reduced, and increases of nearly 100 percent have been documented in low
density suitable habitat. In fact, pup production and survival increase when
density is lower and food availability increases. 146
Here, the wolf is portrayed as a potentially violent, readily adaptable and highly
resilient beast whose population numbers depend not on ESA protections but
on other presumably "natural" factors. The DOJ's wolves possess no personal
or individual characteristics, such as fur color, that might humanize them. They
are not described in familial terms-instead of living in "family groups" with
"strong social bonds" they live within the "social structure" of "packs." Nor are
they described in ecological terms-instead of a description of their role as top
predator within the ecosystem DOJ emphasizes only that the "packs" "occupy"
large areas that they "defend" against competitors. Finally, the pack as depicted
by DOJ consists of easily replaceable parts; the loss of an alpha wolf is almost
immaterial, posing no threat whatsoever to the pack. According to the
plaintiffs, the loss of an alpha wolf "destroys" short-term reproduction, a
problem that is amplified for small populations such as the experimental
populations in the NRM.
Presented with these competing images what is an arbiter to do? Here is
the judge's rendering:
The gray wolf is the largest wild member of the dog family. Wolves
generally live in packs of 2 to 12 animals and have strong social bonds.
Wolf packs consist of a breeding pair (the alpha male and alpha female),
their offspring from previous years, and an occasional unrelated wolf.
Generally, only the alpha male and alpha female of a pack breed. Litters are
born in April and average around 5 pups. All pack members help feed and
protect the pups as they grow. Pups are weaned at 5 to 6 weeks and then are
mature enough to travel with the pack by around October. Packs typically
occupy territories from 200 to 500 square miles. Each pack will defend its
territory against other wolves and wolf packs. 147
In this short description, the judge does not adopt either side's version of the
wolf, preferring instead an independent construction that relies on an earlier
federal rule. The judge does employ some of the same familial language
advanced by the plaintiffs, and though he does not refer to fur color he does
note that "litters . . . average around 5 pups," and that care for the "pups" is a
collective endeavor. The judge also uses some of the same language as DOJ in
referring to the wolves' territoriality. Notably, the judge avoids the controversy
surrounding the pack's resilience upon loss of one or both alpha wolves.
Of course, none of these descriptions is sufficient to accurately or fully
describe the real wolves involved. How could they be? For one thing, lawyers
and judges describe in a few paragraphs what biologists take books to render.
146. Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, DOW v. Hall 1, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160
(D. Mont. 2008) (No. 908CV00056), 2008 WL 2896202 (citations omitted).
147. DOW v. Hall 1, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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For another, much of the diversity and individuality of wolf behavior is
necessarily lost in these purposive redactions-first by the biologists, and
second by the lawyers-as are those behaviors that are inexplicable, yet
perhaps nonetheless definitive. 148 Further, the construction of the Scientific
Wolf, in confining the living and breathing animal inside the pen of what we
know about it and how we know it, subverts the very wildness that is so prized
and reviled by litigants. This wildness remains an aspect of the Scientific Wolf,
but it plays a far greater role in the other types of imagined wolf, the Historic
Wolf and the Mythic Wolf.
2. The Historic Wolf
The Historic Wolf refers to the wolf made virtually extinct from the
contiguous United States in the early twentieth century.149 This wolf appears in
nearly all accounts of the history of wolves in the United States; the fact that
the wolf was made nearly extinct and is managed under the ESA is an
important piece of the story, no matter who is telling it. But who eradicated the
wolf, to what extent, and to what effect depends to a great degree on who is
writing. The stories told in Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt
provide the most striking depictions.
In their 1994 complaint challenging the reintroduction of wolves into
Yellowstone and central Idaho, the farm bureau plaintiffs described the history
in this way: "The Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf (canis lupus irremotus) once
inhabited and/or occupied both the Yellowstone and central Idaho areas. The
Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf is believed to be extinct. However, some
people believe that the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf still inhabits and/or
occupies the Yellowstone and/or central Idaho areas." 150
A second complaint, filed by James and Cat Urbigkit, two Wyoming
residents who claimed to have since 1988 been studying, reporting and making
presentations on remnant wild NRM gray wolves of the subspecies remotus,
went a step further-they were among the people who believed the NRM gray
wolf still existed. 15
By contrast, a third complaint filed by the Audubon Society, the Predator
Project and other environmental and wolf advocates described the history as
follows:
The historic range of the gray wolf stretched from the east to west coast and
south to what is now Mexico City. During the late 1 9 th and early 2 0 th
centuries the gray wolf was the victim of a concerted extermination
148. Robisch challenges the scientific approach to understanding wolves in two informative and
entertaining chapters on "intermediate corporeality" and "advanced corporeality." See ROBIscH, supra
note 128, at 89-122.
149. See id. at 17.
150. Complaint 123, Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997) (No.
94-CV-286D).
151. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. at 1356.
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campaign by federal, state, and local authorities who viewed the wolf as a
threat to their citizenry and to livestock interests. Man's elimination of
native ungulates (the wolf's prey base) and his conversion of wildlands to
agricultural use also hastened the animal's demise. 152
The three descriptions tell fundamentally different stories. The farm
bureaus' complaint provides no context for the cause of extinction, and posits
the possibility that the subspecies of the NRM wolf may never have been fully
extinct. The story thus evokes an apparition of the wild wolf, the possibility of
its lurking in the forests beyond the range. The Urbigkits complaint claims that
the wild, native NRM subspecies really does still exist and that they have seen
it, and rests its argument on the emotional appeal of this apparition. The
Audubon plaintiffs present a story that emerges from a radical environmentalist
ethos. In this telling, the elimination of wolves had definite causes, and these
causes were not merely a matter of poor policy choices or ecological ignorance,
nor even of a fearful lashing out at a threatening force; rather the eradication of
the wolf is depicted as a symptom of the agricultural revolution's emergence on
the American continent and its spread west across it. The problem, then, is
systemic, ingrained as much in the sweep of historical forces as in societal
worldviews and individual consciousness. In this context, the importance of the
world's remaining wildness cannot be overstated.
Presented with these competing stories, the district court judge relayed the
information in this way: "The gray wolf (canis lupus) was extirpated from the
western portion of the United States in the early 1900's."1 53 The Tenth Circuit
did not even bother mentioning this history; instead, the court referred back to
the district court opinion's "detailed facts" and set forth "only a summary of
salient facts" that began with the 1973 listing of the gray wolf as an endangered
species. 154 Thus, the judges did away with the competing narratives animating
the parties' concerns and looked at the issue solely within the frame of the
Progressive Management Machine.
3. The Mythic Wolf
The Mythic Wolf refers to the "totemic, unconscious, and symbolic
images" of the wolf represented in everything from folk tales to Hollywood
152. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y Complaint 17-18, Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. 1349.
153. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. at 1353. Interestingly, this rendition differs
significantly from another Wyoming district court decision, penned some eight years later:
By the early 1900s the demographic collapse of the gray wolf in the western portion of the
United States was at its apex. Nearly the entire population of gray wolves had disappeared.
The near extermination of the gray wolf had many causes, including westward expansion of
the population of the United States, rampant hunting and anti-wolf government policies. It is
generally accepted that the cause of the wolf's demise in the coterminous United States was a
direct result of human depredation.
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (D. Wyo. 2005).
154. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2000).
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movies. 155 The Mythic Wolf may manifest as either a malevolent or a
benevolent force.156 The malevolent Mythic Wolf is Teddy Roosevelt's "beast
of waste and desolation," the evil spirit that frightened the Pilgrims and plagued
the pioneers, and, as I argue, the depredating wolf that continues to haunt the
stockmen and ranchers of the American West. The benevolent Mythic Wolf is
the environmentalist's wolf, the wolf pictured in calendars tromping through
the snow or set on a ridge against a moonlit sky, the wolf that Americans long
to see thriving in wilderness areas and national parks as a symbol of the
remaining wildness of the world. This wolf is portrayed as nonthreatening,
human-like and wise; it represents a potential savior, "not merely oppressed but
transcendent."15 7
Images and imaginings of both the malevolent and benevolent Mythic
Wolf have figured prominently into the politics of wolf management, from the
era of eradication through the era of recovery. More than a few people have
argued that the malevolent Mythic Wolf drove the nation's attempt to eliminate
the wolf. 158 Similarly, many have noted that the malevolent Mythic Wolf has
also, from the outset, informed the development of the federal management
regime. 159 Indeed, the definition of the "problem" wolf pervades the FEIS, the
section 10(j) regulations and the entire recovery program; in fact, it was the
federal government's acknowledgment of the power of this image that forged
the necessary compromise to enable the recovery program to move forward. 160
If the malevolent Mythic Wolf drove people to exterminate the Real Wolf
in the Rocky Mountains, the benevolent Mythic Wolf drove the nation's
attempt to recover it. In the period leading up to the passage of the ESA and the
subsequent listing of the wolf as an endangered species, public perceptions and
political attitudes shifted toward the benevolent Mythic Wolf.161 During that
time, wolves "began to symbolize wild nature, a lost heritage, and were
considered a keystone species-the missing link-to a functioning
ecosystem."1 62 These two positive symbolic functions are central to the
155. See ROBIScH, supra note 128, at 17.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 18.
158. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
159. Goble, supra note 108, at 112 ("The authors of the Wolf Recovery Plan use an odd
combination of language. Mixed in with descriptive statements on population biology and habitat
ecology are prescriptive statements of moral censure. The language suggests a persistence of mythology,
a continuance of 'wolf as moral category in what was to be a strictly biological document.").
160. See Dubuc, supra note 107, at 226-27 (arguing that the section 10(j) compromise was
developed to defuse political opposition to the reintroduction of wolves into wilderness areas).
161. See, e.g., Li, supra note 108, at 685 (determining that wolf control programs stopped because
"of changing public, scientific, and governmental perceptions and because the public no longer viewed
wolves as monsters and cold-blooded killers, but instead as a symbol of the 'freedom and independence'
of the wilderness"). See also Goble, supra note 108, at 106 ("The wolf remains a mythic category. Once
the very essence of lust, greed, and violence, it is now the latest emblem of environmentalism-an
'endangered species."').
162. Thrower, supra note 108, at 319.
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construction of the benevolent Mythic Wolf. First, wolves serve as a symbol of
wildness and wilderness for some and as a symbol of a pastoral lifestyle on the
frontier of the wilderness for others. Second, wolves serve as a symbol of a
restored ecology and, even beyond that, a return to the presettlement Eden of
the Rocky Mountain West. 163
Other scholars have examined how the entrenchment of parties along the
axis formed by the Mythic Wolf s two faces informs the socio-political
discourse. 164 But the Mythic Wolf also informs the legal process, and it is to
that dynamic that I now turn.
a. The Benevolent Mythic Wolf
"Gray wolves are a living embodiment of the remaining wildlands of the
American West." 165 So begins a complaint filed in 2008 in Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hall (DOW 17), in which environmentalists challenged the
environmental review behind one of FWS's attempts to designate and delist the
NRM distinct population segment. This is probably the plainest possible
expression of the wolf s status as a positive symbol for wilderness and wildness
in the American West. The wildness of the wolf, however, has been at the heart
of the controversy since Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt was
litigated in the mid-1990s.
The narrow legal question in that early case was whether the
reintroduction of wolves into Idaho and Yellowstone violated the ESA because
the introduced wolves would not be "wholly geographically separate" from a
163. Peter Coates, Chances with Wolves: Renatunng Western History, 28 J. AM. STUD. 241, 241
(1994) ("[T]he wolfs supreme value resides in how it symbolizes a prelapsarian wilderness that was
once the entire continent.").
164. Nie, supra note 103, at 2-3 ("The wolf continues to be an animal symbolizing larger cultural
values, beliefs and fears.... While a deeply-seated animosity towards the wolf remains strong among a
minority of Americans, for others, the wolf and its restoration now symbolizes our last chance to atone
and make amends with wildlife and wilderness."). See also PETER STEINHART, THE COMPANY OF
WOLVES (1995); BARRY LOPEZ, OF WOLVES AND MEN (1978); BRUCE HAMPTON, THE GREAT
AMERICAN WOLF (1997); Matthew A. Wilson, The Wolf in Yellowstone: Science, Symbol, or Politics?
Deconstructing the Conflict Between Environmentalism and Wise Use, 10 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES
453 (1997). Recently, psychology studies have confirmed the role of the sub- or unconscious in
informing individuals' positions in regards to wolves. In one recent Swedish study, for example,
researchers found that people whose animal fear was directed particularly towards large carnivores were
less likely to be willing to pay, or were likely to be willing to pay a lower amount of money, for
protection of those species. Runar Brannlund, et al., Beware of the Wolf Is Animal Fear Affecting
Willingness to Pay for Conservation of Large Carnivores? (Ctr. for Envtl. and Research Econ., Working
Paper No. 2010:9, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1601847. An earlier study of sheep
farmers, wildlife managers and research biologists in Norway revealed that though the different groups
all endorse general ecocentric values, there were nonetheless positive associations between
anthropocentrism and negative attitudes toward carnivores, and between ecocentrism and positive
attitudes toward carnivores for all three groups, with sheep farmers holding the most anthropocentric
views. Tore Bjerke & Bjorn P. Kaltenborn, The Relationship ofEcocentric and Anthropocentric Motives
to Attitudes Toward Large Carnivores, 19 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 415 (1999).
165. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 1, Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall (DOWII),
807 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Mont. 2011) (No. CV-08-14-M-DWM), 2008 WL 896802.
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"population" of wild wolves, as required by section 100). 166 Yet, the narrative
frame deployed by all three sets of plaintiffs was about wildness. The farm
bureau plaintiffs invoked the oppositional problematics of the purity of
wildness and the impurity of the feral hybrid, alleging that the introduction of
what they called "Canadian wolves" violated the ESA because the relocated
"pure gray wolves ... are likely to disperse without forming packs and are
likely to mate with coyotes or feral dogs and produce hybrid offspring." 67 This
hybridization would "decrease the genetic purity of wolves, to the detriment of
the species."' 68 The Urbigkits focused on the potential impacts on another,
even more wild wolf-the mythic native NRM gray wolf. The Audubon
plaintiffs also pled purity and wildness, though along a different vein. Rather
than focusing on the impacts on the wildness and purity of the introduced
wolves or the native NRM gray wolves, they focused instead on the known
existence of lone dispersers from Canada and Montana, and argued that the
conflation of these "naturally occurring" wild wolves with introduced wolves
would result in weaker protections under the section 100) regime than would
otherwise apply. This change in protection would threaten not only the existing
wild wolves but also future existing wolves, wolves in populations that include
both artificially introduced and naturally occurring wild wolves, and the
descendants of those packs. 169 In a sense, wildness, and the protections it
warrants, would be lost forever. The court's response to these representations is
discussed in Part III.C of this Article.
As noted above, wolves' second positive symbolic function is to represent
a restored ecology, or, on a more symbolic level, a recovered Eden. 170 Wolves
achieve this functionality primarily through their role as top predators within an
ecosystem. The following description from the complaint in DOW II is
emblematic, and seems to have become something of a template:
[W]olves have restored a more natural balance to northern Rockies
ecosystems. Wolves benefit the health of elk and deer populations by virtue
of their selection of prey animals, as they primarily take the old, the very
young, the injured, and the diseased, leaving the healthiest animals to
produce the next generation. In Yellowstone National Park, the renewed
presence of wolves has altered the behavior of the elk, which now tend to
avoid browsing in areas such as stream banks where they are most
vulnerable to predation, and in turn have reduced destruction of young
aspen shoots. The restoration of shrubs and trees in riparian areas controls
stream erosion, and supports native bird communities, beavers, and other
wildlife. Wolves aggressively predate on coyotes within wolves' home
territory. By reducing the number of coyotes in the area, the presence of
166. See infra notes 182-95 and accompanying text.
167. Complaint 192, Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997) (No.
94-CV-286D).
168. Id.193.
169. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y Complaint 1, Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. 1349.
170. See Coates, supra note 163; MERCHANT, supra note 113.
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wolves has also benefited populations of small rodents, birds of prey (who
feed on the rodents), and pronghorn antelopes (who are often preyed on by
coyotes). 171
This description of the wolves' ecological function harkens back to a vision of
undisturbed, stable mountain ecology. It evinces an internally regulated, almost
Disney-fied mountain environment that pre-dates the intrusions of domesticated
livestock and human-caused wolf extirpation. Wolves help the elk by picking
off the old, infirm and weak, ensuring only the strongest survive to consume
limited resources and to reproduce. The threat wolves pose to elk allows stream
banks to recover from the prevalence of elk, and their predation of coyotes
helps all the other animals coyotes prey on achieve greater abundance. In place
of a degraded stream overrun with elk and a degraded mountain-and-range
environment overrun with coyotes, wolves ensure a "more natural" balance.
This description is fully consistent with the visions that inspired reintroduction
in the first place. None of which is to say that any of this is not true, that this is
not the actual role played by real wolves. The point is only that these depictions
in litigation are consistent with other stories, told elsewhere, and that these wolf
stories are what the law must contend with in reaching its resolutions.
b. The Malevolent Mythic Wolf
The malevolent Mythic Wolf appears in a number of ways in the legal
literature, including as an acknowledged cause of the eradicated Mythic
Wolf, 172 but the malevolent presence appears most commonly in the form of
the depredating wolf.173 The case of Gordon v. Norton, provides an
example. 174 The plaintiff in Gordon paints a picture of what I will call the
"rancher pastoral," relying on old images of wildness and wilderness as an
uncontrollable and dark force that threatens the simple, respectable life of
commerce and care on the edge of the Western wilderness. The issue is one of
saving the "town," transformed from the European or New England village to
the loose settlement of a large swath of land by a few noble ranchers. 175 In this
171. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief T37, DOWII, 807 F. Supp. 2d 972.
172. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 n.1 (D. Wyo. 2005)
("The human-wolf dynamic has a sordid history that is by no means a modem issue. The ancient Greeks
offered bounties on wolves. Europeans also harbored animosity toward wolves, an animosity brought
over to North America by the early European settlers. See Aesop, The Wolf in Sheep 's Clothing, circa
7th century B.C.E.").
173. For example, in Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation, the Farm Bureau plaintiffs alleged,
"[w]olves are known to kill cattle, sheep and other livestock. In every area where wolves are known to
occur farmers and ranchers experiences livestock losses from wolves." Complaint 1 25, Wyo. Farm
Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. 1349.
174. Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).
175. In response, FWS tells a story of level-headed and reasonable management based on
observation, science and deliberate decision making, where the outcome is determined by statutory
mandate, rather than almost supernatural forces. The word "lifestyle" does not appear in their brief.
Neither does the word "business." They do not even address the idea that the loss of these unquantifiable
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way, the story harkens back to the history of the earliest rancher-wolf conflicts,
state-sponsored bounties, and the federal wolf eradication programs.
In Gordon, a Wyoming rancher claimed that the NRM wolf recovery
program was an unconstitutional taking, as well as a violation of the ESA. Here
is how plaintiff framed the story:
This action seeks to enjoin the Government's mismanagement of
reintroduced wolves that have killed as many as 159 calves, 11 dogs, and 2
horses on the Diamond G Ranch in northwest Wyoming. Plaintiff Stephen
Gordon's ranch is no longer economically viable and cannot operate as the
working cattle ranch it has been for a century. Wolf depredation prompted
Mr. Gordon to sell off two-thirds of the Ranch's herd and sell a farm used
by the Ranch. Wolves threaten pets, children, and people generally, and
have destroyed a lifestyle based upon the quiet enjoyment of the Dunoir
Valley. 176
The numbers here are notably higher than those eventually accepted by the
court, which described a handful of cattle kills and two dog kills. 77 And the
economic harm is expressed in extreme terms. But the kills and the economic
harm are only half the story. As the paragraph explains, there is threat to
children and pets, to adults, and, ultimately, to the cntire rancher lifestyle. As
the narration proceeds, these threats grow more intense, and far more
pervasive:
While the impact on the Diamond G's business was extreme, the effect on
daily life was worse. In the fall of 1997, with the herd gathered into closer
proximity of the Ranch buildings, Mr. Robinett stayed awake nights
monitoring the wolves with radio telemetry equipment and chasing them
out of the cattle by slamming the doors to his truck, shining lights on them,
and shouting. During one stretch that fall, he stayed up with the cattle for
39 consecutive nights. Wolves killed three of the Gordons' family pets and
attacked and severely injured one of the Robinetts' herding dogs. Wolves
stalked Diamond G personnel and neighbors. Mrs. Robinett, an avid nature
photographer, was warned by Government officials not to venture out to
take pictures with her dogs. The Robinetts, the Gordons, and their
neighbors kept children under close watch and, often, indoors. Parents told
older children to carry guns when they went out.178
The story being told here is one of a long-standing ranch not only subject
to economic harm but also to mortal threat. The drama is cinematic: women,
children and pets are told to stay inside. One of the protagonists, Mr. Robinett,
loses an astounding amount of sleep, or else transforms into a noctumal
values can constitute a constitutional taking. Brief of Appellee-Respondent, Gordon, 322 F.3d 1213
(10th. Cir. 2003) (No. 01-8102), 2002 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 57, at **5-12.
176. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Gordon, 322 F.3d 1213, 2002 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 56,
at *2.
177. Gordon, 322 F.3d at 1215-17.




creature, while keeping vigil for the wolf. Assuming the events did happen, the
scene is nonetheless reminiscent of a fairy tale. Yet, even this state of constant
threat is not the end of it. Monetary damages cannot satisfy justice, in this
circumstance, because what is at stake is not an operating business but an entire
way of life:
The Diamond G's greatest losses cannot be quantified. Mr. Gordon, Mr.
Robinett, and their families have lost a lifestyle. Mr. Gordon cannot ranch
on land that has been a cattle ranch for the past century. Mr. Robinett
spends countless hours hazing wolves and herding cattle back to their
proper location on the Ranch and its allotment. Children and dogs cannot
roam freely on the Diamond G, and guests carry firearms. In sum, the
Government has deprived Mr. Gordon and the Diamond G of the quiet
enjoyment of their property through impacts on lifestyle, personal safety,
and their business. 179
C. The Triumph of the Progressive Management Machine
If choice depictions of the Scientific Wolf, echoes of the Historic Wolf
and portraits of the benevolent and malevolent Mythic Wolf comprise inputs
into the court system, the output is more often than not the trope of the
Progressive Management Machine. The Progressive Management Machine
refers to the science- and technology-based, politically expedient operation of
the environmental bureaucracy in accordance with its statutory mandates, made
subject to judicial review. This figure of the environmental imagination is not
much discussed by ecocritics, but it does have its literary forbears-Aldo
Leopold, chief among them-and it is dominant in the law. Like other
environmental tropes, the Progressive Management Machine communicates
both a story and a narrative. The story involves a condition of environmental
health that is disturbed by a market failure that results in a public goods
problem. The disturbance can only be resolved by the application of the
mechanisms of the administrative state. The narrative involves the ideal of
utilitarian governance, and the possibility of reconciliation. It is legitimated by
the application of the well-established principles of deference and judicial
review in administrative law.
Here, I look again at Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation, which pitted
three different conceptions of nature against each other: the farm bureaus'
rancher pastoral, the environmentalists and wolf advocates' wilderness/
wildness stories and the FWS's Progressive Management Machine story. In the
rancher pastoral, all wolves are problematic, and ranchers are granted special
procedural rights, perhaps even actual control, in wolf management. 180 In the
179. Id. at *13.
180. The farm bureaus claimed that language in section 10(j) regulations required that landowners
affirmatively sign off on any wolf management regulation. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.
Supp. 1349, 1365 (D. Wyo. 1997). The court found that neither the language of the regulations nor the
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wilderness/wildness story, imported "Canadian" wolves threaten to intrude on
the purity of naturally-occurring NRM wolves. In the FWS's story, the
distinction between the NRM gray wolf and the "Canadian" gray wolf becomes
irrelevant because the NRM gray wolf is gone, and the wildness of the lone
dispersers is simply not a persuasive enough image to counteract the biological
imperative of restoring a population. The overall recovery of the species Canis
lupus is the paramount goal.
The district court was asked to decide whether the potential overlap
between the experimental populations and the lone wolves coming down from
Montana and Canada, and the treatment of lone wolves in experimental areas as
members of the experimental population, was permissible under the ESA.
Under section 10(j)(1), experimental populations must be kept "wholly separate
geographically from nonexperimental populations of the same species."'81
Under section 10(j)(2), experimental populations may only be introduced
"outside the current range of such species." 182 FWS argued that there were no
known populations of naturally occurring wolves in the experimental areas,
only individuals, and that the geographically separate requirement only applied
to populations.183 The district court judge deferred to FWS's definition of
populations, 184 but determined that the "wholly separate geographically" and
"outside the current range" requirements required that there be no overlap
whatsoever between experimental populations and individuals from
nonexperimental ones. 185 The lumping of the introduced with the wild would,
in the judge's opinion, impermissibly lessen the protections for the wild by
operating as a "de-facto delisting" of the "naturally occurring" wolves. 186
Thus, the judge disassembled the critical mechanism that had enabled the wolf
recovery effort to move forward-the ability to kill depredating wolves under
section 10(j) regulations-and enjoined the program, all because of the
potential impact on lone wolves coming down from Montana and Canada.187
The district court judge premised his statutory interpretation of section
10(j) on a comment in the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee House
Report that refers to the committee's expectation that where and so long as
experimental populations overlap with natural populations the experimental
populations will be afforded the higher protections of the natural
legislative history behind the enactment of section 10(j) supported a finding that FWS is required to
obtain the ranchers' "agreement." Id. at 1365-66.
181. Endangered Species Act § 10(j)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(1) (2006).
182. Id. § 1539(j)(2).
183. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. at 1370.
184. Id. at 1371-72.
185. Id. at 1372-75.
186. Id. at 1375.
187. See id. at 1372 (noting that that the section 10(j) provisions were designed to limit public
opposition to the reintroduction of top predators, and that the statute allows for relaxed restrictions on
takings of endangered or threatened species managed under the program; these relaxed restrictions,
however, were not intended to reduce protections for non-experimental populations, or individuals).
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populations.' 88  The Committee Report makes no mention of what the
committee's expectations were in regard to overlap between experimental
populations and individuals, but the district court judge nonetheless interpreted
it to do just that. It is impossible from the text alone to say whether the judge
was buying into an archetypal image of the lone wolf as a totem of the human
spirit without saying so, or else using the power of the image to intentionally
subvert the program and issue an otherwise antiwolf decision, or else simply
basing his construction of the statute on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee Report. The opinion is thoroughly couched in statutory language
and the relevant standards of judicial review, and presents itself as the law's
respectful, if not quite deferential, response to agency action. 189
Yet, the interpretive stretch is hard to ignore. Importantly, its plausibility
depends entirely on the power of the image of the lone wolf. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine a judge making a similar decision if the experimental-wild
individual overlap were to occur between, say, experimental populations and a
stray individual arroyo toad, or between re-introduced populations and
individuals of one or another subspecies of steelhead trout. The only way the
decision makes sense is if an individual member of the species means
something important. The lone wolf means different things to different people,
but there is no question that it possesses something more than biological
significance.
The Tenth Circuit appears to have suspected that there was special
treatment being afforded the wolf. In a telling moment, the court quotes from
an amicus brief that explains that other experimental programs have been
populated exclusively by trans-located, ESA-protected individuals. 190 The
effect of this is to de-emphasize the particularities of the wolf and to place the
question of management within a more widespread praxis that also includes the
sea otter, red wolf, whooping crane, California condor, Guam rail and Colorado
squawfish.191
Having demystified the wolf, the Tenth Circuit recast section 10(j) as
being about political compromise, 192 and criticized the lower court's reliance
on a "single piece of legislative history" in crafting its statutory
188. Id. at 1372-73.
189. Id. at 1376 ("Mindful of the dedication, talents and money which have been expended in the
development and implementation of the wolf recovery program, the Court reaches this decision with the
utmost reluctance.").
190. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1237 n.10 (10th Cir. 2000); see also id.
at 1231 (reasoning that under section 7(a)(1) the Secretary of Interior is already authorized to trap and
translocate individual members of endangered species to areas outside the species' present range).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1233 (section 10(j) was enacted to address "agencies' frustration over political
opposition to reintroduction efforts perceived to conflict with human activity ... Congress hoped the
provisions of section 10(j) would mitigate industry's fears [that] experimental populations would halt
development projects").
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interpretation.1 93 Accordingly, the court reversed, finding FWS's interpretation
reasonable.1 94 The reversal divorced the judicial resolution of the matter from
the stories presented by parties in a way that the lower court's decision did not.
In their place the court installed the Progressive Management Machine, a story
about the relationships among the state, the bureaucrats employed by it, the
subject of the regulation and the courts, rather than about the people who came
to court telling their far-out stories.
D. A Reversal ofFortune: The Reintroduction of the WolfMyth through
Political Engineering
In the last few years, the politics of wolf management have again emerged
as paramount, demonstrating how political forces, moved by anti-wolf rhetoric,
can conspire to overwhelm even the Progressive Management Machine. Wolf
politics has factored into continuing litigation,' 9 5 but it made a far more visible
and controversial appearance when, in April 2011, Congress passed a rider to a
defense appropriations bill co-written by Senators Jon Tester (D-Mont.) and
Mike Simpson (R-Idaho) that installed a 2009 FWS rule that had been vacated
by the district court in Defenders of Wildlhfe v. Salazar.196 The Tester/Simpson
rider, legislatively designated a NRM distinct population segment, delisted the
wolf in Montana and Idaho and insulated the reissued rule from judicial review.
Several environmental groups challenged the rule on separation of powers
grounds.197 The opinion dismissing the constitutional challenge, penned by
Judge Molloy of the district court in Montana, who has overseen much of the
193. Id. at 1232.
194. Id. at 1234. The issue of "wholly geographically separate" also comes up in United States v.
McKittrick, a prosecution against a man who had killed and taken home a member of the experimental
population who had wandered from Yellowstone into Red Lodge, Montana. 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.
1998). The Ninth Circuit found that regulations were not improper because: 1) FWS can relocate
unlisted animals from Canada as those animals would be protected as soon as they came into United
States; and 2) the experimental population is "wholly separate" because FWS determined that there were
no breeding pairs in Wyoming. McKittrick, 142 F.3d at 1173-75, 1179 ("A single straggler does not a
population make.") (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
195. Inside the courtroom, politics were at the core of Wyoming's second challenge to FWS's
disapproval of its wolf management plan; Wyoming claimed that FWS "relied on information other than
the best scientific and commercial data available in making its decision not to approve Wyoming's
proposed wolf management plan" and that "FWS allowed political and public relations considerations
and speculative concerns about post-delisting lawsuits to influence its decisions." The court there did not
address the allegations of extra-legal considerations, but nonetheless found the agency's decision that
the entire state must be designated a "trophy game" area rather than a "predator" area was arbitrary and
capricious. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 09-CV-118J, 2010 WL 4814950, at *45 (D. Wyo.
Nov. 18, 2010).
196. Department of Defense and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-10, § 1713, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
197. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1124-25 (D. Mont. 2011)
(describing plaintiffs' claim that because at the time of the rider the district court decision in Defenders
of Wildlife v. Salazar was on appeal the rider, which did not amend the ESA, amounted to an
unconstitutional Congressional directive to the judiciary).
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wolf litigation in recent years, ripped into the politics behind the rider. 198 But
even beyond the politics was the threat to Progressive Management Machine,
as held in check by the judiciary. 199
Under the Tester/Simpson rider, Montana and Idaho wildlife authorities
now manage wolves in those states. 200 Each state authorized and held a wolf-
hunting season in fall 2011. Additionally, in September 2012 FWS delisted the
NRM gray wolf in the state of Wyoming. 201 The wolf hunting season opened
less than a month later.202 A lawsuit quickly followed. 203 Undoubtedly, there
will be more to come.
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL APOCALYPSE
As discussed above,204 the environmental apocalyptic provides a reliably
offensive narrative and rhetorical strategy with which to expand the frontiers of
environmentalism. 205 The litigation in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
provides an on-point case study. 206 In this case, plaintiffs tried to persuade the
judiciary to expand federal common law public nuisance doctrine to cover
global warming, and to thereby shift federal decision making from the political
branches to the judicial. 207 To accomplish this task, the plaintiffs relied on the
198. Id. at 1125 ("The way in which Congress acted in trying to achieve a debatable policy change
by attaching a rider to the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011
is a tearing away, an undermining, and a disrespect for the fundamental idea of the rule of law.").
199. Id. at 1125 ("Political decisions derive their legitimacy from the proper function of the
political process within the constraints of limited government, guided by a constitutional structure that
acknowledges the importance of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. That legitimacy is enhanced by a
meaningful, predictable, and transparent process.").
200. Importantly, Judge Molloy's decision prompted him to also find in favor of the government in
a pending case, Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall (DOW 1l), in which environmentalists had challenged the
environmental review behind the designation and delisting of the NRM distinct population segment that
was the subject of Alliancefor the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Mont. 2011).
201. 77 Fed. Reg. 55,530 (Sept. 10, 2012).
202. Christine Peterson, Wyoming Wolf Hunt Begins Today, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Oct. 1, 2012,
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming-wolf-hunt-begins-today/article 26618da9-0b08-5d5e-
84bf-89ec6931814a.html.
203. Environmental groups have again filed suit. See Christine Peterson, Environmental Groups
Sue Over Wyoming Wolf Listing, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 14, 2012, http://trib.com/news/state-and-
regional/groups-sue-over-wyoming-wolf-delistingarticle_40abal 6c-f330-5bdf-8677-a8c9c lbf7299.
html.
204. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
205. See Killingsworth & Palmer, supra note 76, at 41 (noting that apocalyptic appears "in those
moments of history when the [environmental] movement is seeking to expand, to appeal to new
segments of the general public, to annex new territories in a kind of rhetorical imperialism.").
206. In the interest of full disclosure, I was one of several counsel of record for plaintiff City of
New York in both the district court and the Second Circuit. Nothing in this analysis, however, reveals
anything about plaintiffs' actual case planning, nor does it reflect any conversations among counsel or
between counsel and clients, nor does it disclose any privileged information. My interpretation of the
Complaint is entirely my own, as are my readings of the briefs and opinions that followed it.
207. The history, science, law and policy of climate change have been the subject of a tremendous
amount of scholarship, and even a summary account is beyond the scope of this Article. For the primary
source on the science, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
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persuasive force of the environmental apocalyptic. 208
The litigation was initiated in July 2004, when two separate but well-
coordinated groups of plaintiffs-one a coalition of the States of Connecticut,
California, Iowa, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont, and the
City of New York ("the States"), the other a coalition of private conservation
land trusts ("the land trusts")-filed separate complaints in the Southern
District of New York, claiming that the carbon dioxide (C0 2) emissions from
four private power companies (American Electric Power, Cinergy Corporation,
Southern Company and Xcel Energy) and the Tennessee Valley Authority
("TVA") (collectively, "the power companies") contribute to global warming
and therefore constitute a public nuisance. The number and identities of the
parties was cause for a good deal of lawyering-different States suffered
different types of harms, New York City is not a state, the land trusts are
private parties, TVA is a federal entity with its own peculiar legal status and
some of the defendants have no substantial presence in New York State, all of
which gave rise to numerous motions and arguments over personal jurisdiction
and standing. To simplify things I will treat the land trusts and the States as a
single group of plaintiffs and the power companies and TVA as a single group
of defendants; I will concentrate on the States' pleadings and briefs, the power
companies' challenges to the States and the courts' opinions regarding the
States.209
REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE (2007). For an excellent resource to track ongoing legal developments, see
the various resources available through Columbia Law School's CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
http://web.law.columbia.edulclimate-change (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
208. There are interesting comparisons to be drawn among the different approaches taken in
American Electric Power, Village of Kivalina, Comer, and the Our Children's Trust litigation. None of
the other public nuisance cases shares the American Electric Power plaintiffs' narrative orientation. The
story told by the Kivalina plaintiffs includes an element of apocalypse-the destruction of an indigenous
community's village on Alaska's Arctic coastline-but, as a damages action, the emphasis is on changes
in the Arctic region, specific harms to the village, defendants' polluting activities, and defendants'
knowledge. See Complaint for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Kivalina v.
Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-1138), 2008 WL 594713. The story
told by the Comer plaintiff goes even further in divorcing itself from an apocalyptic narrative, claiming
only "the Earth's climate has 'demonstrably changed' as a result of Defendants' greenhouse gas
emissions." Class Action Complaint at 13, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 839 F.Supp.2d 849 (S.D. Miss.
2012) (No. 00220), 2011 WL 2947582. The Our Children's Trust campaign, in contrast, takes the
apocalyptic narrative arguably further than the American Electric Power plaintiffs' Complaint, discussed
infra. The campaign includes many different administrative petitions for rulemaking, state public trust
lawsuits, and a federal complaint; I view the federal complaint as exemplary of the strategy. See First
Amended Complaint, Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 02235), available at
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2011-07-27%20AMENDEDCOMPLAINT.pdf. The
complaint states that the consequences of climate change are already proving severe, but "our children
and our children's children will surely face even more dire circumstances if the tipping point of climate
change is reached and our impact becomes irreversible." Id. at 1. What's at stake is "a livable future" for
future generations, as we confront "a changed world that threatens human existence as we know it." Id.
at 2. "Earth's atmospheric climate emergency" and the "signs" of that the emergency is reaching the
tipping point are spelled out in great detail. Id. at 18-32.
209. Matt Pawa, a private attorney whose firm represented the land trusts, has given an interesting,
if inevitably filtered, account of the history of planning and coordination among the States and land
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A. The Complaint
The first paragraph of the complaint tells much of the story in a simple,
linear fashion:
Defendants' power plants emit large quantities of carbon dioxide and are
contributing to an elevated level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide is the primary "greenhouse gas." Greenhouse gases trap
atmospheric heat and thus cause global warming. There is a clear scientific
consensus that global warming has begun, is altering the natural world, and
that global warming will accelerate over coming decades unless action is
taken to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. This Complaint seeks an order
requiring defendants to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide, thereby
abating their contribution to global warming, a public nuisance. 210
The story presented here is a conventional tale of environmental disruption:
defendants are industrial actors causing environmental harms. The harms are
linked to an interdependent ecology (involving both "the atmosphere" above
and "the natural world" here below), are scientifically verifiable and are
ongoing, with increasingly dramatic repercussions looming on the horizon. The
harms affect not just people but also "the natural world," in which people live,
or possibly even of which we are a part. The plaintiffs are here to challenge the
status quo. They, however, are not the ones empowered to effect the necessary
change; rather, the court is the hero-in-waiting, the one in the position to draw
the story to its only proper conclusion by providing the order necessary to abate
the nuisance. 211 Within the universe of the complaint such redress is both
necessary 212 and pragmatic. 213
Further examination of the complaint, however, reveals a divergence from
the conventional nuisance story into the environmental apocalyptic. The harms
alleged, and their progression, are particularly telling. At first, the plaintiffs
summarize the harms in broad, almost generic, though nonetheless quite
striking, terms:
trusts and their attorneys that led to and went into the litigation. Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The
Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 ENv. L. REP. 10,230 (2009).
210. Complaint at 1, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104-
05669), 2004 WL 5614397.
211. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 11, at 110-42 (discussing narrative coherence);
Starger, supra note 14, at 1062 (defining "narrative logos").
212. Complaint, supra note 210, at 2 ("The risks of injury to the plaintiffs and their citizens and
residents from global warming increase with the speed and magnitude of global warming. The speed and
magnitude of global warming is primarily dependent, in turn, upon the level of carbon dioxide
emissions. Thus, reducing carbon dioxide emissions reduces the risks of injury to the plaintiffs and their
citizens and residents from global warming.").
213. Complaint, supra note 210, at 2 ("Defendants have available to them practical, feasible and
economically viable options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without significantly increasing the
cost of electricity to their customers. These options include changing fuels, improving efficiency,
increasing generation from zero- or low-carbon energy sources such as wind, solar, and gasified coal
with emissions capture, co-firing wood or other biomass in coal plants, employing demand-side
management techniques, altering the dispatch order of their plants, and other measures.").
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increased heat deaths due to intensified and prolonged heat waves;
increased ground-level smog with concomitant increases in respiratory
problems like asthma; beach erosion, inundation of coastal land, and
salinization of water supplies from accelerated sea level rise; reduction of
the mountain snow pack in California that provides a critical source of
water for the State; lowered Great Lakes water levels, which impairs
commercial shipping, recreational harbors and marinas, and hydropower
generation; more droughts and floods, resulting in property damage and
hazard to human safety; and widespread loss of species and biodiversity,
including the disappearance of hardwood forests from the northern United
States.214
The complaint later details other present and threatened harms, including
the loss of Arctic sea ice; the thawing of permafrost; a later freezing and earlier
break-up of ice on rivers and lakes; the retreat of mountain glaciers throughout
the world, including Glacier National Park, which had at the time of the
complaint already lost two-thirds of the more than 150 glaciers it had in the
nineteenth century; dramatic impacts on animal and plant ranges; and the
bleaching of coral reefs. 215 Still later, the previously summarized harms are
spelled out, in greater and greater detail, from the approximate doubling of
heat-related deaths in New York City and Los Angeles in a 2-30 C temperature
increase scenario, to the inundation of thousands of miles of coastal property
and the flooding of tunnel vent shafts and wastewater treatment plants, to
reduced interlake flow among the Great Lakes adversely impacting the
economies of Green Bay and Milwaukee, to reduced crop yields for Iowa's
90,000 farms, and so on.216
The recitation of this litany of impacts would have been sufficient for the
strictly legal purposes of setting forth a cause of action and alleging concrete
and particularized injuries that establish standing. But a story needs to cohere,
and one means of achieving narrative coherence is to connect the story to
another, more recognizable one. 217 Here, that more familiar story is one of
environmental apocalypse. Thus, the predicted temperature increases associated
with climate change "will constitute an extraordinary shift in world climate that
214. Id. at 1-2.
215. Id. at 23.
216. Id. at 1-42.
217. This point is made with remarkable clarity and panache by the magazine writer and author
Janet Malcolm in Iphigenia in Forest Hills, an article-and later a book-covering a murder trial in
Queens, in which she pinpoints the prosecution's narrative strategy of connecting the accused to a
storyline and set of character motivations familiar from the times of Greek tragedy. See Janet Malcolm,
Iphigenia in Forest Hills, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 2010. See also Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and
Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CUNICAL L. REV. 1, 7
("[J]urors come to their task equipped not only with the narrative process as a mode of thought but with
a store of specific narratives channeling that process. Stock scripts and stock stories accreted from
exposure to the accountings and recountings that continually bombard us-through television, movies,
newspapers, books, the internet, and word of mouth from our earliest childhood perceptions into
happenings, happenings into events, events into stories; and our narrative expectations tell provide all of
us with walk-through models of how life is lived, how crimes are committed, how reality unfolds.").
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is unprecedented in thousands of years of human civilization" and "will have
harmful consequences worldwide." 218 Ultimately, the alleged injuries "are
more than a collection of disparate harms. Together they constitute a threat of a
fundamental transformation." 219
The complaint, then, includes all of the "ingredients" of the American
environmental apocalyptic vision. 220 First, it dramatizes the principle of
interconnectivity or interdependence, making the science of global warming
emotional, its impacts tangible and personal. Second, it implies egalitarianism
among species within the biotic community, placing ecosystemic harms and the
loss of biodiversity under the same umbrella as human health impacts and the
loss of human life. Third, it participates in the Emersonian "aggrandizement of
the minute and the conflation of near and remote" 221 by making each of the
alleged injuries emblematic of the types of injuries that will be suffered
everywhere. Finally, it communicates the sense of imminent environmental
disaster. As the complaint states, "[g]lobal warming already has begun to alter
the climate of the United States," 222 and the "risks of injury to the plaintiffs and
their citizens and residents from global warming increase with the speed and
magnitude of global warming." 223
The complaint also incorporates elements of other tropes common to
environmental literature. For instance, the villains in this story are the
conventional villains in the environmental apocalyptic, as well as in the gothic
tales of toxic discourse: industrial polluters. They are not just any polluters, but
particularly egregious and important ones, the "five largest emitters of carbon
dioxide in the United States and .. . among the largest in the world." 224 They
have been at it for a long time (in one instance since 1837, and in four others
since the first decade of the twentieth century)225 and they both know about the
218. Complaint, supra note 210, at 25.
219. Id. at 41-42.
220. BUELL, supra note 60, at 303-05.
221. Id. at 304.
222. Complaint, supra note 210, at 1.
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id. at 1.
225. Complaint, supra note 210, at 27-28. ("Defendants and their predecessors in interest have
emitted large amounts of carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels for many years. For
example, AEP has been in continuous operation since 1906, when it incorporated in New York State
under the name American Gas and Electric Company. Southern has been in continuous operation since
its incorporation in 1945. Southern acquired its major power-generating subsidiaries in 1949, which
have been in continuous operation since the period 1906-1930. TVA incorporated in 1933 and has been
producing electric power through fossil fuel combustion since the 1940s. Xcel has been in continuous
operation since its incorporation in 1909. Cinergy, incorporated in 1993, owns all the outstanding
common stock of The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., which has been in continuous operation since its
incorporation in 1837. Because the planet's natural systems take hundreds of years to absorb carbon
dioxide, defendants' past and present emissions will remain in the atmosphere for many decades, or
even centuries, into the future.").
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potential harms and have done nothing to mitigate them.226 The protagonists,
by contrast, are somewhat different than one might expect-they are the States,
claiming "an assault on their sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests," 227 as
well as their proprietary interests, rather than workers in a factory subject to
hazardous working conditions or a local community upended by nearby
pollution. Yet, like these more familiar protagonists, the States are victimized
by the industrial polluters, and like the workers and local residents, they
represent "the people," if on a far greater scale.
Finally, like wilderness/wildness stories, the complaint depends on a
"pastoral logic" emanating from an image of a fixed ecology, set in an idealized
past that coincides with representations of white settlers' first encounters:
Glacier National Park in the nineteenth century, average annual temperatures in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Arctic as it has been seen for the last
few hundred years, the general state of the world that led to our existing coastal
land use patterns. Like the NRM wolves, who represent the possibility of a
restored ecology or Eden, the protagonists-victims here stand for a lost world,
though the pastoral logic is complicated by timing. The past is both past and
present, and the loss is largely projected into the future.
B. The Motion to Dismiss and the District Court Ruling: Reframing
Apocalypse as a Political Question
Rather than answer the Complaint, the power companies filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of
action. 228 The motion took two parallel avenues of attack. First, the motion
sought to reframe the issue of the impending apocalypse as one of institutional
competence, filtered through a separation-of-powers lens. 229 Second, the
motion took on the apocalyptic narrative head-on, challenging plaintiffs'
226. Matt Pawa, one of the lawyers involved in the case, has gone even further: "Despite the
overwhelming evidence provided by the science of global warming, the coal, oil, and electric industries
conducted a well-heeled campaign of deception and denial." Pawa, supra note 209, at 10,234. See also
Class Action Complaint $ 41, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (No.
00220), 2011 WL 2947582 (alleging civil conspiracy). The denial was in regard to the science. The
deception was in regard to the costs of mitigation. Pawa, supra note 209, at 10,234-35. And indeed, at
the same time that they were defending this lawsuit, power companies were arguing EPA did not have
authority to regulate GHGs in court and lobbying against action on climate change at the White House
and in Congress. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Jim Snyder, Millions Spent to
Lobby Climate Bill, THE HILL (July 21, 2009), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/51333-millions-
spent-to-lobby-climate-bill (reporting that American Electric Power and Southern Co. spent $4.6 million
and $6.3 million respectively lobbying against the climate bill in 2009).
227. Complaint, supra note 210, at 41.
228. Given the tricky politics of climate change and the various stances the power companies were
taking in relation to it, reaching consensus on how to answer the allegations would have proved more
than a little difficult.
229. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Complaints at 12-




constitutional standing and the sufficiency of their alleged injuries, the
purported causation and the possibility of redress through court injunction.230
The power companies' attempt to reframe climate change as a separation-
of-powers issue was itself marked by a dual strategy. On the one hand, they
assured the judge that other branches were the appropriate ones to act on this
matter and that they had done so. 231 On the other hand, they tried to frighten
the judge away from creating a "new" kind of common law cause of action
specifically for global warming that would invade both congressional and
executive branch functions; 232 this "new" cause of action was contrasted with
the "'simple type[s]' of traditional common law nuisances" which purportedly
did not raise issues of national and foreign policy.233 Thus, the power
companies presented a counter-narrative, one that focused on political actors
dutifully pursuing a well-informed, multi-pronged approach to resolving an
obviously complex and uncertain environmental problem that lies well beyond
the scope of the federal judiciary. 234
The opposition to plaintiffs' standing more directly challenged their
apocalyptic narrative, endeavoring to temper the sense of doom and gloom and
to allay the fear of catastrophe communicated by the complaint. Importantly,
the power companies never claimed that climate change is not happening or
that the alleged harms are not real. Rather, they argued that "[a]lthough
plaintiffs' complaints are replete with claims about the adverse consequences of
global warming, they fail to identify a single actionable injury." 235 In this way,
the power companies reduced and subjected the States' carefully crafted
apocalyptic vision to a mundane standing analysis. The States, the companies
argued, failed to allege injury-in-fact because they claimed no "current
injury,"236 and because the alleged increased risk of harm transpired within an
indefinite timeframe. 237 In addition, though not blameless for global warming,
the power companies were not the villains the States made them out to be; they
were not the legal cause of the States' injuries because their emissions do not
lead directly to the alleged harms. For the same reasons that the power
230. Id. at 28-38.
231. Id. at 5-7, 12-17.
232. Id. at 1.
233. Id. at 19-21.
234. In this way, the power companies told a story about the case law and the nature of federal
public nuisance, rather than about the facts of the case. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 11, at
139 (noting how narrative is "essential to ... establishing the continuity of a line of precedent"). In one
instance, the defendants' attorneys cited to the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in support of their
nuisance story. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 229, at 13. The citation presents an ironic twist, as the
majority in that case claimed that any decision on the patentability of genetic research was a matter of
"high policy" left for other branches while at the same time extending patent protection to living
organisms in a manner that quite plainly was inconsistent with existing statutory regime. See Michael
Burger & Paul Frymer, Property Law and American Empire, U. HAW. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013).
235. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 229, at 28 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 28.
237. Id. at 29-31.
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companies could not be considered the cause of the harms, the harms could not
be considered redressable: a federal nuisance suit was, in short, just not going
to solve the problem of global warming. 238
The States' opposition to the motion to dismiss adopted the power
companies' refraining and largely abandoned the narrative and rhetorical pleas
embodied in the Complaint. First, they tried to assure the court that though
climate change itself represents an extraordinary threat to human civilization
their legal action "fits comfortably within the federal common law of public
nuisance established by more than 100 years of Supreme Court precedent." 239
Thus, they argued that climate change is the product of both "ambient" and
"interstate" pollution, 240 and its effects include the exact types of effects that
have always been considered nuisances: threats to public health and safety;
damage to vegetation; interference with navigation, water supplies and comfort;
and inundation of land. 241 That there are many contributors to the problem is
irrelevant from a legal standpoint, as the principles of joint-and-several liability
apply.242 In addition, they defended against the potential politicization of their
lawsuit by engaging in refraining and legalization, narrowing the scope of the
power companies' separation-of-powers argument and tying it to specific legal
doctrines, namely the political question doctrine, foreign policy preemption,
and displacement of federal common law. 243 As for institutional competence
the States endeavored to shift the judge from the heroic, expansionist role
implied by the complaint's narrative deployment of the environmental
apocalyptic to the heroic, duty-bound role of a federal judge: "The judiciary has
a duty to decide cases. That duty cannot be lightly divested." 244 In regards to
standing, the States' emphasized their status as parens patriae, pointed to the
alleged current injuries to California's snowpack and pitted their seventy-seven
million residents against the power companies' more limited interests. 245
Judge Loretta A. Preska's opinion granting the motion to dismiss is a
testament to the rhetorical efficacy of the power companies' narrative
reframing. 246 The opinion fully adopts the separation-of-powers principles
introduced in the motion to dismiss, grounding a straightforward political
question doctrine analysis in the authority of "the Framers" and the
Constitutional system of "checks-and-balan6es." 247 According to Judge Preska,
238. Id. at 33-38.
239. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 1, Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104-CV-05669), 2004 WL 5614405.
240. Id. at 9.
241. Id. at 8-9.
242. Id. at 13-15.
243. Id. at 1-2.
244. Id. at 17.
245. Id. at 1, 32-35.
246. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
247. Id. at 267. It bears noting that the political question doctrine was not emphasized by either
side in the briefings or at oral argument. Judge Preska acknowledges as much: "Defendants argue that
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the States improperly sought to resolve a matter of "high policy," 248 an issue of
"transcendently legislative nature," 249 in the courtroom. Given the complexity
of policy choices to be made, she decided that the political branches were the
proper venue, holding that an initial policy determination must be made prior to
judicial intervention. 250 To the extent that Judge Preska admitted the
apocalyptic vision set forth in the complaint, it was at something more than an
arm's length distance. While she accepted the facts alleged in the Complaint as
true, as required, she couched each and every fact recited as one that plaintiffs
"allege," "assert," or "say," 251 an obvious way of discounting their importance.
Ultimately, she found the facts alleged and the relief sought "extraordinary," 252
concluding that she was "without power to resolve them." 253
C. In the Second Circuit
Judge Preska's decision to rule on political question grounds allowed her
to avoid ruling on several difficult questions posed by the Complaint and the
motion to dismiss: 1) whether the claimed injuries were sufficient to confer
plaintiffs with standing to bring their suit; 2) whether federal common law
public nuisance can accommodate global warming; and 3) whether any
potential common law claim had been displaced by congressional or federal
agency action. On appeal to the Second Circuit, each of these three issues was
fully briefed, as was the question of whether the political question doctrine
barred a nuisance claim. The appellate briefs are stellar examples of the craft of
lawyering, telling fascinating and tightly-woven stories about the origins and
contours of parens patriae standing, about the nature and history of public
nuisance, about what the federal government had and had not done to date
about global warming and about the scope of the political question doctrine.
The States continued to insist "[g]lobal warming is causing serious, and
potentially devastating, consequences for Plaintiffs' essential resources," 254
and the sense of urgency remained as an overarching motif, but the tone was far
more subdued than in the complaint. The debate had been moved away from
the apocalyptic threat of global warming and into the far narrower world of
doctrinal analysis.
Nonetheless, a two member panel of the Second Circuit-some three
'separation-of-powers principles foreclose recognition of the unprecedented 'nuisance' action plaintiffs
assert,' which I take to be an argument that Plaintiffs raise a non-justiciable political question." Id. at
271 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 271.
249. Id. at 272.
250. Id. at 272-74.
251. Id. at 267-70.
252. Id. at 271 n.6.
253. Id. at 267.
254. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009) (No. 05-5104), 2005 WL 5792737 at *1.
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years after oral argument on the case was heard and only weeks after the third
member of the panel, now-Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, had been
elevated to the Supreme Court-issued a 140-page opinion that addressed each
of the issues. The Second Circuit panel's opinion represents, in my opinion,
one of the most environmental, environmentalist and pro-environment
decisions ever issued by an appellate court. This is not only because the Second
Circuit determined that the States had standing to sue and that the problems
associated with climate change fall well within the outer limits of public
nuisance doctrine, but also, and even more so, because the Second Circuit
largely adopted the States' original, apocalyptic story. Indeed, the plaintiffs'
jeremiad found a receptive and influential audience in the Second Circuit,
whose environmental imagination appears to have been fully alive in its
decision making.
1. Standing and the Transformational Impacts of Global Warming
From the outset of the Second Circuit panel's opinion it is clear that the
court bore a fundamentally different relationship to the litigation and its subject
matter than did Judge Preska. The opinion begins:
In 2004, two groups of Plaintiffs, one consisting of eight States and New
York City, and the other consisting of three land trusts . . . separately sued
the same six electric power corporations that own and operate fossil-fuel-
fired power plants in twenty states ... seeking abatement of Defendants'
ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of global warming. 2 55
Contrast this with Judge Preska's second paragraph, which notes that plaintiffs
had brought their suits "under federal common law or, in the alternative, state
law, to abate what Plaintiffs describe as the 'public nuisance' of 'global
warming'."256 In the Second Circuit, both public nuisance and global warming
have been liberated from the skeptical frame of Judge Preska's quotation
marks, and the two terms are put together into a singular whole: the public
nuisance of global warming. This legal beast is not "what Plaintiffs describe,"
but what the court does.
The court's adoption of the States' theory of the case depended on its
acceptance of global warming's dire impacts. The court's acceptance of these
impacts is plainly communicated in the first instance in an expansive recitation
of the present and predicted harms to the States and the land trusts.257 In this
account, the plaintiffs not only "allege," "assert," and "say," they also
"contend," "posit," "caution," "predict," "detail[] the harms," "spell out the
expected future injuries" and "categorize[] in detail a range of injuries the
States expect will befall them within a span of 10 to 100 years if global
255. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314.
256. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (emphasis added).
257. Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 315-19.
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warming is not abated." 258 The court's acceptance of the impacts is also
premised in its acceptance of global warming science. As the court noted, the
States "cite[] reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences" 259-Judge Preska made no mention
of these reports, though they were referenced in the complaint. 260 The court
also noted that the States and the NAS caution about the "the risk of an abrupt
and catastrophic change in the Earth's climate when a certain, unknown,
tipping point of radiative forcing is reached." 261 Nothing stimulates the
apocalyptic imagination so much as the concept of an end-date, a point of no
return. For global warming, the "tipping point" provides that marker. 262
In addressing at length the standing arguments, the Second Circuit
conveys a radically different perception of the States and their role than did
Judge Preska-the States have recovered their protagonist status. 263 Rather
than intrusive busybodies seeking to compel the courts to overstep their bounds
with overblown hyperbole, they are cast as informed and informative victims
seeking to fill a regulatory gap with a procedurally proper, substantively
legitimate legal action. The States' parens patriae status reveals their
beneficent motives: They are not just "nominal parties," but representatives of
the people. 264 The court goes so far as to repeat the States' argument that in
other times injuries such as those enumerated in the complaint would have been
cause for war, and that their standing to sue is necessitated by the original
republican compromise that formed the United States.265 The casus belli
argument is plainly legal fiction, far removed from the facts of the case, but it is
a convenient way to underscore the severity of the harms, and to justify pushing
the law to its limits.
The courts' authentic acceptance of the alleged injuries as facts, its
validation of the predictive science and its grant of standing on parens patriae
grounds all reflect the efficacy of the environmental apocalyptic trope and, in a
way, reinvent the imaginative construction as legal reasoning. Thus, the
opinion is a truly environmentalist one-it embraces not only the logos of
ecology and the ethos of interdependence but also the pathos of environmental
apocalypse. The import of this environmentalist ideology is evident in the
court's reversal of Judge Preska's ruling on political question grounds.
258. Id. at 317-18.
259. Id. at 317.
260. Complaint, supra note 210, at 22, 40.
261. Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 317.
262. The relationship between the "tipping point," global warming and the apocalyptic trope is the
subject of both a documentary film and a related book. See BEYOND THE TIPPING POINT? (2010);
FUTURE ETHICS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND APOCALYPTIC IMAGINATION (Stefan Skirmshire ed. 2010).
263. Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 332-39 (where the court treats the States' parens patriae
standing); id. at 339-49 (where the court treats the States and land trusts' proprietary and Article III
standing).
264. Id. at 338.
265. Id. at 334.
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2. Handling Political Questions, Public Nuisance Doctrine and
Complexity in the Face ofApocalypse
The Second Circuit panel's elucidation of the political question doctrine
and its detailed analytic performance under Baker v. Carr266 amounts to a
reprimand of the lower court and a call to arms in the face of climate change.
The political question doctrine, the panel notes, must "be cautiously
invoked.... [S]imply because an issue may have political implications does
not make it non-justiciable." 267 Following the Fifth Circuit, the court warns
that Baker "is not satisfied by 'semantic cataloguing' of a particular matter as
one implicating 'foreign policy' or 'national security.' Instead, Baker demands
a 'discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular
case' before a court may withhold its own constitutional power to resolve cases
and controversies." 268 Accordingly, the Second Circuit walks carefully through
the Baker test, factor by factor, finding that none of the factors weigh in favor
of finding the public nuisance claim non-justiciable. 269
The Second Circuit's Baker analysis, and its decision to reverse, hinges on
a relatively straightforward acceptance of the States' argument that federal
common law of public nuisance accommodates their action. According to the
Second Circuit, the absence of federal action under statutory environmental law
"does not mean that Plaintiffs cannot bring an action and must wait for the
political branches to craft a 'comprehensive' global solution to global
warming": a common law federal nuisance claim is readily available as "such
claims have been adjudicated in federal courts for over a century." 270
The availability of the federal common law public nuisance claim further
reflects the courts' embrace of the apocalyptic story and the environmentalist
ideology, and its acceptance of the challenge to do something in the face of the
gathering storm. The power companies' primary challenge to the existence of
the nuisance claim was that federal common law public nuisance only applied
to "simple" types of nuisances, that is, ones where the sources are clearly
identifiable and lead directly to the complained of harms. This argument re-
presents the political question issue, raising the possibility that there are matters
that are just too complex to deal with in court and that must instead be worked
out in the political arena. The Second Circuit's rejection of this argument, and
its affirmation that public nuisance can accommodate the extraordinary degree
of ecological, economic, ethical and political complexity that define global
warming pushes the common law perhaps as far as it has ever gone.
266. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
267. Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 323 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (cautioning that the
doctrine "is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases' and that, in the foreign relations
sphere, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance")).
268. Id. at 323 (quoting Lane ex rel. Lane v. Hallibuiton, 529 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2008)).
269. Id. at 323-31.
270. Id. at 331.
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3. Displacement of Common Law
There is no easily articulated standard for determining when federal
legislation displaces federal common law. The standard resembles the field
preemption test familiar to federal-state preemption analysis, but it remains
distinct. 271 To construct an approach to the question of displacement, the
Second Circuit relied on various formulations from Milwaukee v. Illinois j,272
Matter of Oswego Barge Corp.,273 and County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation of N. Y State,274 settling on an amalgamated sense of displacement that
considers whether Congress has spoken directly to the particular issue at bar or
whether Congress has left some gap for the courts to fill. Placed within the Law
& Literature frame of this Article, the question reduces to something akin to an
equivalency test: What have the political branches been doing about the world-
threatening problem of global warming, and is it enough to excuse the courts
from getting involved?
By the time of the Second Circuit's decision, there had been two important
developments in climate change law in the United States. First, the Supreme
Court had decided in Massachusetts v. EPA that carbon dioxide is an air
pollutant subject to potential regulation under the Clean Air Act.275 Second, on
remand from the Court, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had
issued a draft endangerment finding for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from
new motor vehicles. 276 The Second Circuit panel properly understood that
these two developments implied that GHG emissions from stationary sources
would probably be regulated if emissions from new motor vehicles were.277 The
court, however, focused on the draft status of the endangerment finding and
271. Id. at 371 n.37 (noting that "the appropriate analysis in determining whether displacement of
the federal common law has occurred is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal law pre-
empts state law") (internal quotes and citation omitted).
272. Id. at 371 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981) ("[T]he question [of]
whether a previously available federal common-law action has been displaced by federal statutory law
involves an assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress
addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common law."); id. at 374 (quoting Milwaukee, 451
U.S. at 324 ("The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a
particular manner.")).
273. Id. at 374 (quoting Matter of Oswego Barge Corp, 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981)) (noting
that the Second Circuit has previously interpreted Milwaukee to provide a strict test for determining the
preemptive effect of a federal statute; instead of inquiring whether "Congress ha[s] affirmatively
proscribed the use of federal common law," courts conclude that federal common law has been
preempted as to every question to which the legislative scheme "spoke directly," and every problem that
Congress has "addressed.").
274. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985) (Courts
ask "whether the federal statute '[speaks] directly to [the] question' otherwise answered by federal
common law. As we stated in Milwaukee II, federal common law is used as a 'necessary expedient'
when Congress has not 'spoken to a particular issue."')).
275. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
276. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009).
277. Am. Elec. Power. Co., 582 F.3d at 377-78.
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concluded that EPA had not as yet made any final decisions on GHG emissions
regulation.278 Indeed, the court found that EPA regulation of GHG emissions
from stationary sources would have to be at an advanced stage before federal
common law would be displaced: "Until EPA completes the rulemaking
process, we cannot speculate as to whether the hypothetical regulation of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act would in fact 'speak[] directly' to
the 'particular issue' raised here by Plaintiffs, which is otherwise governed by
federal common law." 279
The facts before the Second Circuit made for an extraordinarily close call
on displacement. The Supreme Court had determined that a federal statute
provided for regulation of GHG emissions, and EPA had initiated efforts, at a
preliminary and draft stage, to go ahead and regulate. It is not difficult to
imagine a different panel, or a different circuit court, reaching the opposite
conclusion. But the Second Circuit's decision was compelled by and consistent
with its receptivity to the apocalyptic narrative. The sense of urgency evident in
the earlier portions of the court's opinion demanded judicial intervention. Had
the court been more skeptical of climate change science or the accuracy of
predicted impacts, or had the court taken more comfort in the political
branches' action on the climate change front, it probably would have found the
claim displaced. Thus, the opinion provides at least some evidence of the
efficacy of environmental narrative as legal rhetoric.
D. The Administrative State Arises to Combat Climate Change
In June 2011, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Connecticut
v. American Electric Power, the regulatory lay of the land had changed. EPA
had issued its final endangerment finding for greenhouses gas emissions from
motor vehicles; together with the Department of Transportation the agency had
issued a final rule regulating emissions from light-duty vehicles and initiated a
rulemaking covering medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. EPA had also begun
regulating GHG emissions from industrial facilities, phasing in best available
control technology requirements for new or modified "major emitting
facilities," and initiating a Section 111 rulemaking to set limits on GHG
emissions from new, modified, and existing fossil-fuel fired power plants, with
a final rule due to be issued by May 2012.
EPA's activity fundamentally transformed the case. The Supreme Court,
and thus the federal judiciary, was essentially let off the hook. The case became
one about the Court's institutional legitimacy in the face of its own past
278. Id.
279. Id. at 380. The power companies also argued that the Clean Air Act and a number of other
statutes establishing programs and providing funding for climate research displaced the common law
nuisance claim. Taking these statutes individually and as a group, the Second Circuit determined that




decisions and the operation of the administrative state rather than a case about
at least some branch of the federal government stepping up in the face of
environmental apocalypse. Three of the four issues addressed at great length by
the Second Circuit basically disappeared. On standing, the eight-member court
(Justice Sotomayor did not rule on the case) split along party lines to uphold
Massachusetts v. EPA, allowing the Second Circuit's decision to remain
untouched. 280 The outcome of the political question doctrine is less clear. The
opinion noted that in addition to finding standing, the four justices also found
"that no other threshold obstacle bars review;" 281 there is no mention of how
the four opposing standing came down on the political question issue. As for
the existence of a federal common law public nuisance claim, the court punted,
not having to reach the issue, declaring that the question of whether or not there
exists a federal common law of nuisance for the impacts of climate change had
become "academic." 282
Thus, the Court was left to address its two key areas of concern in relation
to displacement, the sole remaining issue: the precedent set by Massachusetts v.
EPA and the comparative competence of courts and administrative agencies to
handle the problem of GHG emissions and climate change. As a matter of
precedent, those members of the Court who might have been sympathetic to a
nuisance claim had to find satisfaction in the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, roots the opinion firmly in that
precedent decision, and frames the displacement issue as a linear progression
typical of and defined by administrative law: The Supreme Court held that EPA
has the authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. EPA, in
response, was doing just that. If the States proved unsatisfied with the outcome,
they could seek judicial review. There was no room for a parallel common law
track. 283
With the Progressive Management Machine finally operational, the Court
was free to indulge in the common tropes of comparative institutional
competence familiar to so many administrative law cases. First, Justice
Ginsburg resituated the global warming problem within the "high policy"
frame, though without raising the specter of the political question doctrine. 284
Then, she reinforced the basic rationale underlying the administrative state:
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here,
EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas
280. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2537.
283. The lawsuits themselves "began well before EPA initiated the efforts to regulate greenhouse
gases," and therefore were presumably excusable, or else cert-worthy. Id. at 2533.
284. Id. at 2539 ("[T]he appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-
producing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other questions of national or international
policy, informed assessment of competing interests is required. Along with the environmental benefit
potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption must weigh
in the balance.").
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emissions. The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal
judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency
can utilize in coping with issues of this order. Judges may not commission
scientific studies or convene groups of experts for advice, or issue rules
under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested
person, or seek the counsel of regulators in the States where the defendants
are located. Rather, judges are confined by a record comprising the
evidence the parties present. Moreover, federal district judges, sitting as
sole adjudicators, lack authority to render precedential decisions binding
other judges, even members of the same court.285
The Court's resort to an administrative law analysis was predictable. 286
Yet, the way in which it disengaged from the environmental story is revealing.
The Court both voiced and disavowed any vulnerability to the influence of the
apocalyptic narrative. It gave voice to the story by couching it in the
presumably well-balanced authority of the federal government, noting that
"EPA concluded that 'compelling' evidence supported the 'attribution of
observed climate change to anthropogenic' emissions of greenhouse gases,"
and that climate change could include the dire consequences detailed by the
plaintiffs. 287 As for its own position, the Court cautioned that it "endorses no
particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions
and climate change." 288
Despite the apparent finality of the decision, and despite Justice
Ginsburg's refined neutrality, most of the underlying legal questions remain
unresolved. The Supreme Court sidestepped the appellate court's
environmentalist readings of standing and nuisance law, and it barely addressed
the relevance of the political question doctrine. As for displacement, it is now
clear that federal common law public nuisance claims are displaced where the
Supreme Court finds that legislation delegates authority to a federal agency to
regulate a given pollutant, provides a means for citizens to petition the agency
for a rulemaking and submits the agency's decision on the petition to judicial
review. 289 This judgment, then, constitutes a legal fiction, one whose meaning
has been and will continue to be determined through interpretations by the
parties to the litigation, the agencies involved in GHG emissions regulation,
political decision makers, other litigants, other judges and many other as-yet-
unknown readers. Such an end is unavoidable, given the narrative nature of the
law: "What the judgment will mean after all, the judgment that pretends to end
285. Id. at 2539-40.
286. See Lazarus, supra note 25; Levy & Glicksman, supra note 24; Cannon, supra note 33.
287. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 (internal citations omitted).
288. Id. at 2533 n.2.
289. Recently, the Ninth Circuit, following the Supreme Court's holding, determined that the
damages action in Native Village of Kivalina was also displaced. See Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049
(5th Cir. 2010), petitionfor writ of mandamus denied sub nom., In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011).
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the story, is still open, as the trial and judgment themselves become the
elements of a story: perhaps in a court of appeals, perhaps just in the
neighborhood." 290
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to illustrate the contribution a Law & Literature
approach can make to environmental law scholarship. Several projects are now
in progress that further develop the methodology, the data set and the sense of
their significance. One essay tests the utility and limits of the approach by
undertaking an investigation into the role of the imagined Arctic in the
litigation surrounding attempts to drill exploratory wells in the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas. 291 Another paper applies forward my conclusion that
environmental stories matter to environmental law by identifying emerging
storylines that that are beginning to prove influential and by reckoning with the
possibility that new narratives may be necessary to respond to the post-climate
change era. 292
The present study suggests that courts can and do respond to the tropes of
American environmental literature categorized in definitive works of
ecocriticism. Indeed, the occasional short-term victories for wilderness stories
and apocalyptic visions in the courts and the power of administrative law
principles to subordinate these narratives to the Progressive Management
Machine both imply that environmental lawyers and environmental law
scholars should consider the dynamics between narrative, rhetoric and legal
advocacy. Of course, an easier conclusion to reach is that environmental stories
do not particularly matter because they are not demonstrably effective at
persuading judges to decide one way or another; that environmental lawyers
would do fine to reserve their stories for the occasional rhetorical flourish and
for satisfying clients who want to see and hear their voices represented in court;
and that attention is best paid to perfecting the art of the appeal of
administrative decisions. This may well be true, but I do not see the added
value in it. The practice of environmental law as a specialized form of
administrative law is already fully developed. Lawyers in the field know how
to practice that craft.
The conclusion that stories matter to environmental law exposes and opens
to debate the value systems embedded in the dominant modes of environmental
scholarship-primarily science and economics, with ethics as a distant third.
Herein lies perhaps the most potent critique a Law & Literature approach
290. James Boyd White, Telling Stories, in HERACLES' Bow, supra note 1, at 186.
291. Michael Burger, "The Last, Last Frontier," in LAW'S IDEA OF NATURE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST
APPROACH (forthcoming 2013).
292. Michael Burger, Recovering from the Recovery Narrative: On Glocalism, Green Jobs and
Cyborg Civiliization, 46 AKRON L. REv. (forthcoming 2013).
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poses. It is not that these other approaches are false, it is that they are
incomplete, and that they actively suppress and subordinate the emotive and
intuitive understandings and personal experiences that inspire environmental
activists, wolf advocates, Western ranchers, industrial capitalists, government
bureaucrats, scientists, politicians, judges, juries and everyone else. This is not
to say that it represents a better approach to solving environmental problems,
but that it is an inevitable one, and that recognition of its inevitability can more
deeply inform our understanding of environmental law.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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